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THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PARADOX: 




This paper seeks to explain a paradox: Why does Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination currently look so much more expansive than its prohibition on race 
discrimination?  Why in particular, do workers appear to be receiving greater protection 
for expressions of gender identity than for expressions of racial identity?  I argue that as 
a doctrinal matter, the paradox is illusory—the product of a fundamental 
misinterpretation of recent sex discrimination case law by scholars.  Rather than 
reflecting fundamentally distinct antidiscrimination principles, the race and sex cases in 
fact reflect the same traditional commitments to ending status discrimination and 
undermining group-based subordination.  Nonetheless, as a practical matter, the paradox 
is real.  Courts are more likely to protect workplace expressions of gender identity than 
racial identity.  The divergence, I contend, flows not from law, but from culture--in 
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 In 1964, when Title VII1 was passed, its target was clear.  At the time, 
African Americans were routinely excluded from jobs and even from whole 
industries.2  Women too were confined to “pink collar” jobs and often barred 
from the more prestigious and profitable positions reserved for men.3
In the ensuing years, a great deal has changed.  No longer do women and 
minorities face categorical barriers to entry into the work world.  Employers seek 
workers who possess technical job qualifications and who project the right 
corporate image.  Those women and minorities who have the right qualifications 
and “fit” the corporate mold are readily included.
   Title VII 
sought to end this kind of categorical status-based discrimination. 
4
But “fitting the corporate mold” has race- and sex- based implications, 
and one of the great insights of recent employment law scholarship has been the 
recognition of those implications.  Workplace conformity demands are raced, 
scholars argue, in that they often require employees to match white middle class 
   
                                                 
1  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2000). 
2   See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 409 (1975) (employer operated a racially 
segregated plant reserving high pay and high skill jobs for whites); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 426-28 (1971) (employer refused to hire blacks to any but its lowest paying jobs). 
3  Diane Bridge describes, for example, a Westinghouse manual from the early 1900’s which 
provided that: “the lowest paid male job was not [to] [sic] be paid a wage below that of the 
highest paid female job, regardless of the job content and value to the firm.”   She also quotes the 
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union contract from 1913 which limited women to the 
less skilled jobs and provided that “the highest paid female could not earn more than the lowest 
paid male.”  See Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping: Historical and Legal 
Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 581, 599 (1997). 
4  This is not to suggest that status-based discrimination no longer exists, only that it has 
diminished and rarely takes the open and explicit forms of the past. 
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norms of dress, speech, appearance and behavior.5   Workplace conformity 
demands are gendered in that they require employees to embrace traditional 
conceptions of masculinity and femininity.6
Certainly not all scholars agree.  Richard Ford, most notably, has objected 
to protecting employees from conformity demands with which they can choose 
to comply.
  Title VII, these scholars argue, 
should protect workers from such assimilationist conformity demands.   
7  He worries that protecting workers’ expressions of racial or gender 
identity will essentialize groups based on traits and attributes that may be both 
contested and harmful.8
                                                 
5  See generally Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CAL . L. REV. 623, 646 (2005) 
(arguing that workplace cultures “define acceptable and favored behavior along a white, male 
norm”); Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective 
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L. J. 2009, 2029 (2005) (describing as “transparently white 
decisionmaking” the process by which employers define workplace rules and expectations 
according to white cultural norms); KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING 131 (describing the racial covering 
demands imposed on minority workers in order to conform to white assimilationist workplace 
demands); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262, 
1294 (2000)  (describing the “identity work” minority employees must do to comply with white 
cultural workplace norms); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination 
by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 NYU L. REV. 1134, 1194-95 (2004) (describing employers’ 
shift from facially discriminatory policies to facially neutral ones that prohibit racially associated 
behaviors and attributes).   
6  See generally Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation 
Provisions to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 340-41 (1997) (explaining that “courts have 
found that it is legal for employers to rely on what they see as dominant societal rules about how 
men and women should dress.  Although courts have long held that Title VII prohibits 
employers from relying on stereotypes about men and women, courts in these cases overtly and 
unapologetically have allowed them to do just that.”); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender 
from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE 
L. J. 1, 66-68 (1995) (arguing that sex-specific dress codes constitute sex discrimination under Title 
VII); Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community 
Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2543-44 (1994) (describing and explaining 
courts’ allowance of substantially different dress and appearance standards for female and male 
employees). 
7  See RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RACIAL CULTURE: A CRITIQUE 188-190 (2005). 
   Nonetheless, the critical debate in employment law in 
8  See Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/ LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 55 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002) (discussing the 
dangers of essentializing groups by defining them in terms of the traits they have historically 
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recent years has been over the appropriate degree of judicial deference to 
workplace assimilation demands. 
In the sex context, many scholars argue that courts have already adopted a 
new anti-assimilationist antidiscrimination principle—one that protects workers 
from demands that they perform their gender in sex stereotyped ways.9  Scholars 
point for support to Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in which the Supreme Court held 
that an employer’s refusal to promote a female employee because she was 
deemed overly masculine was a form of sex discrimination.10  They also point to 
the widespread circuit court protection of male employees harassed because they 
are deemed overly feminine,11 and the Sixth Circuit’s protection of pre-operative 
male-to-female transsexuals disciplined for cross-dressing.12
                                                                                                                                                 
been permitted to have); Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not? 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1804-
06 (2000) (questioning whether the rights-to-difference approach is the best mechanism for 
challenging status group oppression). 
9  See Joel Wm. Friedman, Gender Nonconformity  and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 205, 219 (2007) (contending that Price Waterhouse 
articulated the principle that “nonconformity to gendered expectations can constitute a form of 
statutorily proscribed sex-discrimination.”); Cynthia Estlund, The Story of Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 65, 66 (Joel Wm. Friedman ed., 2006) (arguing 
that Price Waterhouse should be read as a case that would “condemn decision making that is 
tainted by group stereotypes” and noting that this “broader reading has been a linchpin of a 
generation-long effort to find in Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination some basis for the 
protection of gender nonconformists—gay men and lesbians, ‘effeminate’ men and ‘masculine’ 
women, transsexuals, and others whose sexual preferences and outward behavior defy 
conventional gender stereotypes”); Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati & Gowri Ramachandran, The 
Jespersen Story: Makeup and Women at Work, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STORIES 105, 135 (Joel 
Wm. Friedman ed., 2006) (arguing that “a number of recent judicial opinions” reflect an 
understanding of Price Waterhouse as being “fundamentally about gender nonconformity and sex 
stereotyping”); Katie Koch & Richard Bales, Transgender Employment Discrimination, 17 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L. J. (forthcoming, 2008), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015548 (contending 
that in Price Waterhouse “[t]he Supreme Court  . . . modified . . . the traditional definition of ‘sex’ 
through judicial interpretation to include gender nonconforming behavior”). 
10  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
    
11  See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001); Doe v. City of Belleville, Ill., 119 
F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).  
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In the race context, however, scholars note that no similar principle has 
taken hold. Courts uniformly and explicitly refuse to protect minority workers 
from demands that they assimilate to culturally white dress, behavior and 
appearance norms.  Courts refuse, for example, to protect African American 
women from workplace grooming codes barring cornrows13  or to protect non 
native English speakers from English-Only workplace rules.14
These cases suggest a paradox.   Although Title VII prohibits employment 
discrimination based on both race and sex, race was its primary target.
  
15
                                                                                                                                                 
Several other circuits have endorsed similar protection in principle.  See, e.g., Bibby v. Phila. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 262-63 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that “a plaintiff may be able to prove 
that same-sex harassment was discrimination because of sex by presenting evidence that the 
harasser’s conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did not conform to the stereotypes of 
his or her gender”); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that “[t]he Court 
in Price Waterhouse implied that a suit alleging harassment or disparate treatment based upon 
nonconformity with sexual stereotypes is cognizable under Title VII as discrimination because of 
sex”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n. 4 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining 
that “just as a woman can ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her 
because she did not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a claim on 
evidence that other men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped 
expectations of masculinity”) (citation omitted).  Female workers harassed for their perceived 
masculinity have also received protection.  See, e.g., Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 
195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1224 (D. Or. 2002) (denying employer’s motion for summary judgment 
because plaintiff had presented evidence such that a jury could find she had been harassed 
because she was deemed inappropriately masculine in her traits and appearance). 
12  See Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733-38 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding a sex 
discrimination jury verdict in favor of a male-to-female preoperative transsexual denied a 
promotion to police sergeant for failure to conform to masculine sex stereotypes, including 
coming to work wearing makeup and a French manicure); Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 
566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a preoperative male-to-female transsexual diagnosed with 
Gender Identity Disorder who was discriminated against after he began “to express a more 
feminine appearance and manner on a regular basis, including at work” could state a claim for 
sex discrimination). 
13  See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., 
No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224 (N.D. Ga. May 26, 1981); McBride v. Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cv-0196-
cc, 1996 WL 755779 (N.D. Ga. Sept., 19, 1996). 
14  See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 
1980). 
  The 
15  Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
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addition of sex was an afterthought, one commonly interpreted as an act of 
sabotage.16  Moreover, sex received weaker protection than race under Title VII, 
just as it does under the equal protection clause.17
In this paper I do not seek to join the normative debate over the extent to 
which antidiscrimination doctrine should protect anti-assimilationist conduct by 
workers.
  Why then are courts currently 
interpreting Title VII so as to provide workers with more expansive protection 
from assimilationist demands under its sex discrimination prohibition than 
under its race discrimination prohibition?  More specifically, why do courts 
appear to be adopting a new anti-assimilationist antidiscrimination principle in 
sex cases while rejecting such a principle in race cases?  
18
                                                                                                                                                 
terms, conditions or privileges o employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).  
16  See Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against 
Neutrality, 83 TEX. L. REV. 167, 168-69 (2004) (describing the process leading to the inclusion of sex 
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
17 Title VII includes an exception to its general antidiscrimination mandate which permits 
discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin in “instances where religion, sex or 
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of that particular business or enterprise.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1998).  Title VII 
does not include a BFOQ exception for race.  Moreover, while race receives strict scrutiny under 
the equal protection clause, sex receives the lower intermediate level scrutiny.  See U.S. v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (noting that strict scrutiny has not been extended to 
classifications other than race or national origin). 
  I seek instead to make sense of the case law.  My goals are two fold:  
first to explain when and why courts protect employees from workplace 
conformity demands that constrain expressions of racial or gender identity; 
second to explain why this protection looks more expansive in sex cases than 
race cases.  
18  I have joined the normative debate in other articles.  See Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex 
Discrimination, supra note 16; Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination: An 
Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365 (2006). 
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I begin in Part I by examining whether courts are in fact adopting a new 
anti-assimilationist antidiscrimination principle in sex discrimination cases.  I 
conclude that they are not.  Indeed, I argue that courts’ rejection of such a 
principle in sex discrimination cases parallels their more explicit rejection of such 
a principle in race discrimination cases.  In Parts II and III, I consider the 
explanatory power of two more traditional antidiscrimination principles.  Part II 
examines the extent to which courts’ decisions can be explained by an 
antisubordination principle prohibiting conformity demands that reinforce race 
and sex hierarchies.  Part III examines the extent to which courts’ decisions can 
be explained by a status-based antidiscrimination principle prohibiting 
conformity demands that penalize traits that are more status-like than conduct-
like.  I conclude that courts’ protection of nonconformists in both sex and race 
cases is best explained by these traditional antidiscrimination principles.  The 
seeming divergence between race discrimination and sex discrimination 
jurisprudence is due not to doctrinal differences but to differences in the ways 
conformity demands operate in the two contexts. 
I.  AN ANTIASSIMILATION PRINCIPLE 
In recent years, scholars have increasingly urged upon courts a new anti-
assimilationist antidiscrimination principle.  Title VII, they argue, should protect 
employees from demands that they “perform” their gender or race in accordance 
THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PARADOX 
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with mainstream social norms.19
It is easy to understand why many recent scholars have read 
contemporary sex discrimination jurisprudence as incorporating a new anti-
assimilationist antidiscrimination principle.
  In sex discrimination cases, courts have 
sometimes seemed to agree, while in race discrimination cases, courts’ rejection 
of such arguments have been unwavering.  In this Part I, argue that, contrary to 
initial appearances, the race and sex cases are in fact doctrinally parallel with 
both rejecting claims for anti-assimilationist protection under Title VII.      
A. Gender Nonconformity 
20  The Supreme Court’s 1988 ruling 
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, as well as numerous subsequent circuit court 
opinions, have encouraged such a conclusion.21
Price Waterhouse involved a claim of sex discrimination brought by a 
woman deemed insufficiently feminine by her employer.  Ann Hopkins had 
worked at Price Waterhouse for five years when, in 1982, she was proposed as a 
candidate for partnership.  At the time, the firm had 662 partners of whom seven 
were women.  Of the 88 people proposed for partnership that year, Hopkins was 
the only woman.
  Such a reading is, however,  
mistaken.  
22
                                                 
19  See Carbado & Gulati, supra note 
  Despite the fact that the district judge found that “[n]one of 
5 (criticizing demands that workers “perform” their racial or gender 
identity in particular ways); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L. J. 769, 887 (2002) describing covering 
demands as requiring that individuals “perform” their identities in particular ways). 
20  See supra note 9. 
21  490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
22  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233. Forty-seven of the candidates were admitted to the 
partnership, 21 were rejected, and 20 including Hopkins were held for reconsideration the 
following year.  Id.   
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the other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year had a comparable 
record in terms of successfully securing major contracts for the partnership,”23  
Hopkins was denied promotion.24  The partner who was responsible for 
explaining to Hopkins the reasons for the company’s decision advised that in 
order to improve her chances the following year, Hopkins should “’walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have 
her hair styled, and wear jewelry.’”25
The Supreme Court agreed, relying on an argument against sex 
stereotyping.  “We are beyond the day,” the Court explained, “when an 
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched 
the stereotype associated with their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to 
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike 
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from 
sex stereotypes.’”
  Hopkins sued alleging she had been the 
victim of sex discrimination.   
26
The Court’s language, prohibiting an employer from “assuming or 
insisting” that an employee conform to group stereotypes, distinguishes two 
types of workplace stereotyping:  ascriptive stereotyping and prescriptive 
stereotyping.  Ascriptive stereotyping occurs when an employer assumes that an 
   
                                                 
23  Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1112 (D.C. D.C. 1985).  
24  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233. 
25  Id. at 235 (quoting district court opinion at 618 F. Supp. at 1117).  Before the time for 
reconsideration came, the partners in Hopkins’s office withdrew their support of her and told her 
she would not be reconsidered for partnership.  Id. at 233, n. 1. 
26  Id. at 251 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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individual possesses certain traits and attributes because of her group 
membership.  Prescriptive stereotyping occurs when an employer insists that an 
individual possess certain traits and attributes because of her group membership.  
 Ascriptive sex stereotyping had been illegal well before Price Waterhouse27  
and was not what Hopkins faced.  She was not denied a promotion because her 
employer believed that she possessed stereotypically feminine traits and 
attributes.  Hopkins was denied a promotion because she did not possess the 
stereotypically feminine attributes her employer thought appropriate and 
desirable for a woman.   It was the Court’s prohibition on prescriptive 
stereotyping that was critical to Hopkins’ victory.28
Both the Court’s ruling and its language in Price Waterhouse suggested 
then a broad new anti-assimilationist antidiscrimination principle--one 
protecting workers from prescriptive stereotypes demanding that they conform 
    
                                                 
27  See e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (striking down a federal statute 
providing dependent benefits for spouses of male service members but providing the same 
benefits to the spouses of female service members only upon their showing actual dependence 
for over one half of their support); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 44 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 
1971) (striking down the employer’s no marriage rule, which applied only to female flight 
personnel because it was based on sex stereotypes about women’s domestic role).  See also 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544-45 (1971) (Marshall concurring) (arguing that 
an employer may not discriminate against female employees with young children based on 
evidence that women generally have more child-care responsibilities than men). 
28  It is not clear that the Court fully grasped how different these two forms of sex stereotyping 
were when it placed them quickly under the same label. Ascriptive stereotyping involves 
predictive judgments about what characteristics are possessed by persons of different sexes and 
typically affects employees at the hiring stage. Prescriptive stereotyping involves normative 
judgments about how people of different sexes should behave and constrains employees 
throughout their employment.  Nonetheless, the Court’s language in the case does make explicit 
reference to both types of stereotyping.  See id. at 250 (asserting that “in the specific context of sex 
stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or 
that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender”).     
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to sex-appropriate gender norms. 29   Gender nonconformists, it seemed, were 
entitled to antidiscrimination protection. 30
Plaintiffs wasted no time in seeking to take advantage of such protection.  
Male employees harassed because of their perceived effeminacy have been 
particularly successful.  In Doe by Doe v. City of Belleville, for example, the Seventh 
Circuit ruled that the harassment of two boys who were perceived by their male 




                                                 
29  There is still a broader version of the antiassimilation principle calling for the protection of all 
expressions of personal identity, whether connected to one’s gender identity or not, but since 
such a version is not grounded in antidiscrimination doctrine and is not a plausible account of 
courts’ current antidiscrimination jurisprudence, I do not discuss it here.   
30  As the Court memorably explained: “It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in 
a description of an aggressive female employee as a requiring ‘a course at charm school.’  Nor, . . . 
does it require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal 
skills’ can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s 
sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.”  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 
256. 
31  119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997).  Belleville involved the harassment of two sixteen-year-old brothers 
working for the city as summer groundskeepers.  Both brothers were subject to taunts and abuse 
by their male coworkers, but one of the brothers, H. Doe, was the main target.  The harassment of 
H. focused on the fact that he wore an earring and was perceived as overly feminine.  Id. at 567.  
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Belleville was vacated by the Supreme Court for further 
consideration in light of its decision in Oncale.  City of Belleville v. Doe by Doe, 523 U.S. 1001, 
1001 (1998).  The case then settled before there was a decision on remand.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Oncale did not, however, directly challenge or retract the gender stereotyping logic set 
forth in Price Waterhouse on which the Belleville decision relied.  See Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2001) (opining that “there was nothing in Oncale  . . . 
that would call into question” the holding in Belleville that harassment based on failure to live up 
to gender stereotypes was sex discrimination). 
  In concluding that the plaintiffs had presented evidence sufficient to 
show that they had been harassed because of sex, the Seventh Circuit relied on 
the Supreme Court’s anti sex stereotyping language from Price Waterhouse.  The 
Seventh Circuit explained that “a man who is harassed because his voice is soft, 
his physique is slight, his hair is long, or because in some other respect he 
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exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how 
men are to appear and behave, is harassed ‘because of’ his sex.”32
The Ninth Circuit provided similar protection to the plaintiff in Nichols v. 
Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.
   
33  Antonio Sanchez worked as a host and then a 
food server at Azteca restaurants in Washington State.34  During his four-year 
tenure at Azteca, Sanchez was subjected to a steady stream of taunts and insults 
focusing on his perceived effeminacy.35  Relying on the Supreme Court’s 
prohibition of sex stereotypes in Price Waterhouse, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Sanchez had suffered actionable sex discrimination.36  “At its essence,” the court 
explained, “the systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a belief that 
Sanchez did not act as a man should act.  . . .  Price Waterhouse sets a rule that bars 
discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes.  That rule squarely applies to 
preclude the harassment here.”37
                                                 
32  Id. at 581. 
33  256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001). 
34  Id. at 870. 
35   According to the court, “Male co-workers and a supervisor repeatedly referred to Sanchez in 
Spanish and English as ‘she’ and ‘her.’  Male co-workers mocked Sanchez for walking and 
carrying his serving tray ‘like a woman,’ and taunted him in Spanish and English as, among 
other things, a ‘faggot’ and a ‘fucking female whore.’” Id. at 870. 
36  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the harassment was sufficiently severe to violate Title VII, 
that it was because of sex, and that the employer was liable for the harassment for failing to take 
adequate steps to stop it.  See id. at 873, 874-75, 877. 
   
37  Id. at 874-75.  The Ninth Circuit faced a similar case one year later in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 
Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).  Medina Rene worked as a butler on an exclusive floor 
of the MGM Grand Hotel reserved for wealthy and famous guests.  Id. at 1064.  All of the other 
butlers on the floor were male.  Id.  Rene was subjected to a constant stream of abuse from his 
supervisor and fellow butlers.  Id.  The conduct included “whistling and blowing kisses at Rene, 
calling him ‘sweetheart’ and ‘muneca’ (Spanish for ‘doll’), telling crude jokes and giving sexually 
oriented ‘joke’ gifts, and forcing Rene to look at pictures of naked men having sex.” Id.  In an en 
banc decision, a majority of the panel held that Rene had stated a claim for sexual harassment in 
violation of Title VII.  Id. at 1068.  In a plurality opinion of the court, Judge William Fletcher 
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In recent years, the Sixth Circuit has relied on Price Waterhouse to provide 
similar protection from gender conformity demands to transsexual cross-
dressing men.38  In Smith v. City of Salem, the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff 
had successfully pleaded sex discrimination based on his allegations that he was 
suspended because of his failure to meet stereotypically masculine behavior and 
appearance norms.39  The plaintiff, Jimmie Smith, worked as a lieutenant in the 
Salem Fire Department in Salem, Ohio.40  He was a biologically male pre-
operative transsexual who had been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder 
(GID).41
                                                                                                                                                 
(joined by Judges Trott, Thomas, Graber and Fisher) concluded that the alleged harassment was 
‘because of’ sex because of the sexual nature of the abuse.  Id. at 1066-68.  In a concurring opinion, 
Judge Pregerson (joined by Judges Trott and Berzon) argued the case was better understood as a 
gender stereotyping case in which Rene was harassed because he had traits that were deemed 
inappropriately feminine.  Id. at 1068-69 (Pregerson, J., concurring). 
38  See Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).  While the Sixth Circuit was the 
first circuit court to provide such protection, a few district courts had previously, and have 
subsequently, recognized similar antidiscrimination protection for transsexual individuals from 
gender conformity demands.  See Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding 
that male to female transsexual could state actionable sex discrimination claim when employer 
rescinded job offer after learning that plaintiff had gender dysphoria and would be presenting a 
female appearance at work); Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ. A 05-243 2006 WL 
456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006) (holding that a pre-operative male-to-female transsexual who 
alleged harassment and termination based on failure to conform to gender stereotypes could state 
a claim for sex discrimination); Kash v. Maricopa Cty. Community College Dist., No. 02-1531-
PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954 at *2 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2004) (holding that plaintiff—a transitioning 
male-to-female transsexual—could state a claim for sex discrimination based on allegation that 
she was required to use the men’s bathroom); Tronetti v. TLC Health Net Lakeshore Hosp., No. 
03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 22757935 at *4 (W.D. NY, Sept., 26, 2003) (transitioning male-to-
female transsexual alleging harassment and discrimination because she failed to “act like a man” 
could state claim for sex discrimination); Doe v. United Consumer Financial Servs., 2001 WL 
34350174 (N.D. Ohio, Nov. 9, 2001) (holding that transsexual male-to-female alleging she was 
terminated because her appearance did not match gender expectation could state a claim for sex 
discrimination).  
39  378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004). 
40  Id. at 568. 
41  The court explained that according to the American Psychiatric Association, GID is “a 
disjunction between an individual’s sexual organs and sexual identity.” Id. at 568. 
  After Smith began presenting a more feminine appearance at work his 
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co-workers began to comment on his appearance and inadequate masculinity.42  
Upon learning about Smith’s GID, the Chief of the Fire Department held a 
meeting to find a basis for terminating his employment.43  Shortly thereafter, 
Smith was suspended for an alleged infraction of department policy.44
After Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against 
women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, 
is engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would 
not occur but for the victim’s sex.  It follows that employers who 
discriminate against men because they do wear dresses or makeup, 
or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination 
because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim’s 
sex.
  Smith 
sued for sex discrimination.  In reversing the district court’s grant of judgment 
on the pleadings for the City, the Sixth Circuit held that Title VII protected 
transgendered workers from demands that their expressions of gender identity 
conform to their biological sex.  Relying on Price Waterhouse for support, the 
court explained: 
45
The Sixth Circuit affirmed a jury finding of such discrimination one year 
later in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati.
 
 
46  Barnes was a pre-operative male to female 
transsexual who worked as a police officer in the Cincinnati Police Department.47
                                                 
42  Id. at 568. 
43  The court noted that the Chief of the Fire Department “arranged a meeting of the City’s 
executive body to discuss Smith and devise a plan for terminating his employment.” Id. at 568. 
44  Id. at 569. 
45  Id. at 574. 
46  401 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2005). 
47  Id. at 733. 
  
He presented evidence at trial showing that he was denied a promotion to 
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sergeant because he violated masculine stereotypes.48  The jury ruled in Barnes’ 
favor on his sex discrimination claim.49  Relying on its prior ruling in Smith for 
support, the court explained that a jury could have reasonably concluded that 
Barnes was discriminated against because of his failure to conform to masculine 
gender norms.50
 Nonetheless, and despite the judicial rhetoric, there is reason to doubt that 
a broad anti-assimilationist antidiscrimination principle is really motivating 
these decisions.
   
51
                                                 
48  Barnes, for example, was told by a supervisor that he was not masculine enough and was told 
by another superior officer that he was going to fail probation because he was not acting 
masculine enough.  Id. at 738. 
49  Id. at 733. 
50  Id. at 737-38.  See also Schroer v. Billington, 2008 WL 4287388 (D.D.C., Sept. 19, 2008) (bench 
trial verdict for male-to-female transsexual using sex stereotyping theory). 
  Courts’ regular denial of protection to gender nonconformists 
challenging sex-based grooming codes belies such a principle.  After Price 
Waterhouse as before, courts routinely permit sex-based grooming requirements 
that prescribe how employees may express their gender.  Courts uphold 
workplace grooming codes requiring that male, but not female, workers keep 
51  It is worth noting that not all scholars have interpreted Price Waterhouse as articulating an anti-
assimilationist principle of the sort described here.  Mary Anne Case, for example, has 
interpreted Price Waterhouse as requiring a kind of formal equality between the sexes whereby 
any gendered traits  or behavior deemed appropriate for individuals of one sex must also be 
permitted to individuals of the other sex.  See Case, supra note 6.  Case contends: “[Effeminate 
men] as well as  . . . men who violate sex-specific grooming codes by wearing feminine attire to 
work . . . are clearly protected by both the plain language of Title VII and the holding in Hopkins.  
If their employer tolerates feminine behavior or attire in women but not in them, the employer is 
subjecting them to disparate treatment in violation of Title VII.” Id. at 7.  I have argued previously 
that this formal “trait equality approach” is both conceptually vague—because true cross-sex trait 
equality can never exist—and normatively unappealing—equating  nondiscrimination with rigid 
gender-blind neutrality may do as much to harm women as to help them.  Moreover, this is not 
the interpretation of Price Waterhouse that has been adopted by the lower courts.  See. Yuracko, 
Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, supra note 16, at 185-204. 
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their hair short.52  Similarly, courts uphold grooming requirements prohibiting 
male, but not female, employees from wearing earrings.53  Indeed, courts 
reaffirm such requirements even in cases in which they rely on sex stereotyping 
rhetoric to check other kinds of conformity demands.  In Nichols v. Azteca, for 
example the Ninth Circuit used the sex stereotyping rhetoric of Price Waterhouse 
to hold that discrimination against a male worker because of perceived 
effeminacy was a form of sex discrimination.  Nonetheless the court emphasized 
that its “decision does not imply that there is any violation of Title VII 
occasioned by reasonable regulations that require male and female employees to 
conform to different dress and grooming standards.”54
                                                 
52  See, e.g., Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 101 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that 
male employee fired for not complying with employer’s short hair requirement for men could not 
state a claim for sex discrimination); Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685, 685 (2d Cir. 
1976) (holding that “requiring short hair on men and not on women does not violate Title VII”); 
Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400, 401 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v. Continental 
Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976); Knott v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 
527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975); Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publ. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 
(5th Cir. 1975); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 
U.S. 1046 (1975); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
53  See, e.g., Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Iowa, 2003) (holding in response 
to sex discrimination claim brought by male employee fired for refusing to stop wearing an 
earring that “personal grooming codes that reflect customary modes” of distinctly gendered 
grooming do not constitute sex discrimination); Macissac v. Remington Hospitality, Inc., 811 
N.E.2d 524 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (enforcement of grooming code prohibiting male but not female 
employees from wearing earrings did not constitute sex discrimination); Kleinsorge v. Eyeland 
Corp., 2000 WL 124559 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (grooming code allowing female but not male employees 
to wear earrings did not violate Title VII); Lockhart v. La-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602 (Or. Ct. App. 
1990) (holding that grooming code prohibiting male but not female employees from wearing 
facial jewelry did not constitute sex discrimination); Capaldo v. Pan Am. Federal Credit Union, 
1987 WL 9687 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 1987) (grooming code prohibiting men but not women from 
wearing earrings did not constitute sex discrimination). 
54  Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875 n. 7. 
  Similarly, in Smith, the 
Sixth Circuit distanced itself from prior case law denying antidiscrimination 
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protection to transsexuals,55 but it did not disavow or reject prior case law 
enforcing sex-specific grooming codes generally. 56
 A broad anti-assimilationist principle is also incompatible with the en 
banc Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co. allowing an 
employer to require that female, but not male, bartenders wear makeup.
  These cases undermine the 
plausibility of a broad judicial commitment to protecting gender nonconformity 
as such.  
57  
Darlene Jespersen had worked as a bartender at Harrah’s for twenty years when 
she was terminated for refusing to comply with the company’s sex-specific 
makeup requirement.58  The makeup requirement was part of a new “Personal 
Best” program imposing grooming and appearance requirements on all 
bartenders.59  While the program dressed bartenders of both sexes in the same 
uniform of black pants, white shirt, black vest and black bow tie, the program 
also required female bartenders to wear makeup while prohibiting male 
bartenders from doing so.60
                                                 
55   The Smith Court explains that the logic of these “pre-Price Waterhouse cases from other federal 
appellate courts holding that transsexuals, as a class, are not entitled to Title VII protection” have been 
“eviscerated.”  Id. at 572-73. 
56  The Smith court did not, for example, mention its holding in Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Company, 549 
F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977), upholding a hair length restriction on male but not female employees against a 
claim of sex discrimination.    
57  444 F.3d 1104 (2006) (en banc).   
  Specifically, female bartenders were required to 
wear “facial powder, blush, and mascara . . . applied neatly in complementary 
58  Id. at 1105.  For a more extensive description of the events leading up to Jespersen’s lawsuit see 
Carbado, Gulati & Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 120.  
59  444 F.3d at 1107. 
60  Id. at 1107. 
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colors” with “[l]ip color  . . . worn at all times.”61  Jespersen challenged the 
makeup requirement as a form of illegal sex discrimination.  She relied, in part, 
on the Supreme Court’s rhetoric against sex stereotyping from Price Waterhouse.62  
The makeup requirement discriminated against her, she argued, by “requiring 
[her to]  . . . conform to sex based stereotypes as a term and condition of 
employment.”63
The Ninth Circuit rejected Jespersen’s claim and affirmed summary 
judgment for Harrah’s.  With bald implausibility, the Ninth Circuit proclaimed: 
“There is no evidence in this record to indicate that the policy was adopted to 
make women bartenders conform to a commonly-accepted stereotypical image 
of what women should wear.”
 
64
                                                 
61  Id. at 1107.  Female bartenders were also required to have their hair “teased, curled or styled 
every day.”  Male bartenders were required to keep their hair short, their fingernails trimmed, 
and wear no facial makeup.  Id. at 1107. 
62  Jespersen also raised an unequal burdens argument.  See id. at 1108. 
63  Id. at 1108. 
64  Id. at 1112.  As Judge Pregerson argued in dissent, it is difficult to see what a requirement that 
women must wear makeup and men must not could be based on other than a sex stereotype.   
According to Judge Pregerson:  
The inescapable message is that women’s undoctored faces compare unfavorably 
to men’s, not because of a physical difference between men’s and women’s faces, 
but because of a cultural assumption—and gender-based stereotype—that 
women’s faces are incomplete, unattractive, or unprofessional without full 
makeup.  We need not denounce all makeup as inherently offensive . . . to 
conclude that requiring female bartenders to wear full makeup is an 
impermissible sex stereotype and is evidence of discrimination because of sex.   
Id. at 1116. 
  More revealingly, the court expressed its 
concern that if it were to protect Jespersen from having to comply with the 
makeup requirement “we would come perilously close to holding that every 
grooming, apparel, or appearance requirement that an individual finds 
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personally offensive, or in conflict with his or her own self-image, can create a 
triable issue of sex discrimination.”65
There is, however, a narrower anti-assimilationist principle that courts 
might be adopting.  Yet, as I will suggest, it too fails to fit the cases.  This 
narrower principle would protect not all personal and idiosyncratic expressions 
of gender identity, but only those that are culturally associated with the group in 
some way.
   
Therefore, although the Ninth Circuit seemed puzzled by the logic and 
scope of both Price Waterhouse and the effeminate men harassment cases, it was 
clear in its conviction that Title VII did not protect all gender nonconformists.  
About this, there seems to be judicial agreement.   
66
                                                 
65  Id. at 1112. 
66  The association may be due either to prevalence, history or cultural meaning but what is 
important is that the trait being penalized is one that is not only important to the employee’s 
individual sense of group identity, but is one that is recognized as important to some broader 
cultural conception of the group.  
   The principle would, for example, protect female workers who 
choose to wear traditionally feminine attire to work, such as skirts or frilly 
blouses, from being forced to dress in more masculine attire—at least without 
proof from their employer that such attire directly impaired job performance.  
More significantly, the principle would call for a reconceptualization of 
traditionally male jobs so as to protect and accommodate traditionally feminine 
attributes like empathy and relationship building.  A law firm accustomed to 
hiring only highly aggressive and competitive individuals as litigators would, for 
example, be forced to consider whether individuals who were cooperative 
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problem solvers might be in fact be equally effective.  Unlike the broad 
antiassimilation principle, the narrower principle is aimed at preserving group 
culture not at protecting individual identity.   
Feminists have argued for antidiscrimination protection of this sort for 
decades, both as a way to elevate the feminine and as a way to improve the 
status of women.67   Kathryn Abrams and Laura Kessler, for example, have 
sought greater protection for a culturally feminine caregiving norm.68   Both have 
argued that employers should be obligated to restructure jobs and workplaces so 
as to accommodate women’s caregiving work toward others.69  Mary Anne Case 
has argued for the protection of feminine clothing styles in the workplace 
whether worn by female or male workers70
                                                 
67  As Lucinda Finley asked over 20 years ago: “[R]ather than blaming women and their nature 
for their underrepresentation in the high paying jobs, why not reexamine the jobs and their 
values?” Luncinda M. Finley, Choice and Freedom: Elusive Issues in the Search for Gender 
Justice, 96 Yale L.J. 914, 939 (1987). 
68  See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAN. 
L. REV. 1183 (1989); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, 
Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J. L. 
REF. 371 (2001). 
  “Discrimination against the 
feminine” she notes “is likely to have a disparate impact on women” and, as a 
69  See Abrams, supra note 68, at 1224-25 (“If women with children are to attain equality in the 
workplace, then we must challenge the notion of a natural or pre-ordained line dividing work 
and family. . . .  Employers will have to determine which jobs or tasks can be shred or 
accomplished through flexible scheduling, grant fringe benefits to part-time workers, and re-
educate clients to greater confidence in the new arrangements”); Kessler, supra note 68, at 372-73 
(“women, more so than men, perform the unpaid family caregiving work within our society. . . . 
“The American workplace and discrimination laws governing employment have yet to address 
seriously this profound existential difference between men and women with regard to 
caregiving, despite women’s substantial presence in the paid labor force for more than two 
decades.”). 
70  Case, in fact, argues strongly that feminine styles must be protected whether worn by female 
or male workers.  See Case, supra note 6, at 7 (“It is my contention that, unfortunately, the world 
will not be safe for women in frilly pink dresses—they will not, for example, generally be as 
respected as either men or women in gray flannel suits—unless and until it is made safe for men 
in dresses as well.”). 
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result, “should be permitted only if job-related and justified by business 
necessity.”71
The narrow antiassimilation principle is, however, wholly inconsistent 
and incompatible with courts’ ready deference to employer demands that 
women leave their cultural femininity at the workplace door.  In Wislocki-Goin v. 
Mears, for example, the plaintiff, who worked at a juvenile detention center, was 
fired for wearing her hair down and wearing excessive makeup to work in 
violation of her employer’s unofficial dress code demanding the “’Brooks 
Brothers look.’”
   
Despite Case’s argument that the feminine should be protected regardless 
of whether it is expressed by women or men, one could argue that culturally 
associated traits should be protected only when performed by in-group 
members—outsider performance may represent only an imitation and 
inauthentic version of the trait.   Interpreted in this way, the narrow 
antiassimilation principle is consistent with courts’ refusal to protect men 
wishing to express traditionally feminine traits at work--such as earrings and 
long hair.  It is likewise consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s refusal to protect 
Darlene Jespersen’s desire to express a traditionally male attribute at work—an 
unmade-up face.    
72
                                                 
71  Case, supra note 
   The plaintiff sued for sex discrimination.  The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the employer and echoed the 
6, at 4. 
72  831 F.2d 1374, 1376-77. 
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lower court’s deferential acceptance of the employer’s grooming requirements.  
Rather than requiring the employer to show that the plaintiff’s feminine style 
actually impeded her job performance, the court simply presumed the 
reasonableness of the employer’s grooming requirements.73
The court was similarly deferential to male workplace norms in Chi v. Age 
Group, Ltd.
  
74   The plaintiff, Theresa Chi, had worked long hours coordinating 
imports for her employer before taking maternity leave for the birth of her 
second child.75  At the end of her leave, Chi told her employer that she would 
like to return to work on a part-time basis and would no longer be able to work 
overtime.76   The employer denied Chi’s requests saying that full-time work with 
regular overtime was required.77  It subsequently deemed her unqualified for her 
position and fired her.78  Chi sued for sex discrimination.  In ruling for her 
employer on summary judgment, the court concluded that Chi had not even 
made out a prima facie case of discrimination because she could not show she 
was “qualified for her position.”79
                                                 
73  831 F.2d 1374, 1380 (“We cannot say that these requirements were not reasonably related to 
[the employer’s] ‘legitimate interest[s]’”) . 
74  Chi v. Age Group, Ltd., No. 94 Civ. 5253 (AGS), 1996 WL 627580 (S.D. N.Y., Oct. 29, 1996). 
75  Id. at *1-2. 
76  Id. at *2. 
77  Id. at *2. 
78  Id. at *2. 
79  Id. at *5.  As the court itself notes, such a conclusion is “unusual” given that the burden on the 
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case is “’not onerous.’”  Id. at *5-6.  
  As Kessler notes in her discussion of the case, 
“[t]he court did not consider the possibility that Age Group might work out a 
flexible schedule with Chi . . .” so that she might be  “qualified” if only her job 




The court’s approach was the same in the well known case of EEOC v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., in which the EEOC alleged that Sears had engaged in a 
pattern or practice of excluding women from commission sales positions.
  Rather than protecting culturally feminine caregiving 
norms, the court uncritically accepted the employer’s male normative workplace 
demands.   
81   The 
EEOC presented evidence showing that women were significantly 
underrepresented in commission sales jobs.82   Sears defended by arguing that 
lack of interest rather than discrimination was responsible for women’s 
underrepresentation.83  Commission sales jobs, according to Sears’ Retail Testing 
Manual required a “’special breed of cat,’” someone who “possesses a lot of drive 
and physical vigor, is socially dominant, and has an outgoing personality . . . .”84 
Sears looked for candidates who were “aggressive[ ],” “assertive[ ],” 
“competitive[ ]” and with a “social or extraverted personality.”85
                                                 
80  Kessler, supra note 
    Women, 
Sears, argued were simply less interested in the positions than men.  In 
concluding that women’s lack of interest, rather than Sears’ discrimination, was 
to blame, the court did not pause to consider whether Sears’ masculine job 
description and hiring criteria may have affected women’s interest in the 
68, at 371.   
81  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1295 
(N.D. Ill. 1986). 
82  Id. at 1295. 
83  Id. at 1305. 
84  Id. at 1290. 
85  Id. at 1290.  In addition, Sears gave most candidates a test which asked such questions as “do 
you have a low pitched voice?” “Do you swear often”” “Have you played on a football team?” Id. 
at 1300 n. 29. 
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positions.  Nor did it require Sears to demonstrate that such masculine attributes 
were in fact necessary for successful job performance.  Far from protecting 
culturally feminine traits and attributes, the court used them to justify women’s 
exclusion.  
In short, the dominant interpretation of recent sex discrimination case law 
as incorporating a new antiassimilation principle is mistaken.  Neither a broad 
principle encompassing all individual expressions of gender identity, nor a 
narrow principle protecting culturally recognized expressions of gender identity 
inheres in the case law.  
B. Racial Nonconformity 
In the race context too scholars have urged courts to adopt an anti-
assimilationist antidiscrimination principle—one protecting minority workers 
from demands that they conform to white middle class norms.  In race as in sex 
cases, however, courts refuse to interpret and apply Title VII in this way.  
Most often the scholarly arguments for protection in race cases are based 
on narrow antiassimilation grounds--regarding the need to protect group 
culture—rather than broad antiassimilation grounds—regarding the importance 
of individual expression.  Barbara Flagg, for example, has argued that 
antidiscrimination law should protect racial minorities from being required by 
employers to adopt “behaviors and characteristics associated with whites.”86
                                                 
86  Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 
104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013-15 (1995). 
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Such “transparently white decisionmaking” should be treated as discriminatory 
because it forces blacks to “shed or disavow crucial facets of blackness” in order 
to get ahead in the work world.87  Juan Perea makes a similar argument with 
respect to culturally associated traits and Title VII’s prohibition on national 
origin discrimination.88  Perea contends that most of the discrimination faced by 
ethnic minorities results from their possession of certain traits, not from the fact 
of their national origin or place of birth.89  As a result, he argues, Title VII should 
protect against discrimination based on “physical and cultural characteristics 
that make a social group distinctive in group members’ eyes or in the view of 
outsiders.”90
                                                 
87  Id. at 2034.  Paulette Caldwell too has argued for antidiscrimination protection for workplace 
expressions of racial identity and from employer demands of white cultural normativity.  
Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 
365, 387 (1991) (contending that “[a]ntidiscrimination law should be, and at its best is, directed 
toward the behavioral manifestations of such negative associations” with racially identified 
traits).  See also Gear Rich, supra note 
 
5, at 1139 (arguing that “courts should abandon the current 
definitions of race and ethnicity under Title VII that exempt from protection ‘voluntary’ aspects 
of racial and ethnic identity—what I call ‘race/ethnicity performance’’’); Tristin K. Green,  
Discomfort at Work: Workplace Assimilation Demands and the Contact Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379 
(2008) (explaining that “[a]ssimilation demands have surfaced as one of the most important—and 
controversial—issues facing employment discrimination today. . . .  The issue is important 
because assimilation demands represent one of the more subtle and common ways in which 
discriminatory biases can translate into subordination and exclusion of women and people of 
color from the modern workplace”). 
88  Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin” Discrimination Under Title 
VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 833, 839 (1994). 
89  Id. at 839. 
90  Id. at 833.  Perea describes such characteristics as including, but not limited to, “race, national 
origin, ancestry, language, religion, shared history, traditions, values, and symbols, all of which 
contribute to a sense of distinctiveness among members of the group.”   Id. at 833.  See also 
Cristina M. Rodriguez, Language Diversity in the Workplace, 100 NW. L. REV. 1689, 1694 (2006) 
(arguing for a presumption of invalidity of English-only rules in the workplace); Drucilla Cornell 
& William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and Intrinsic Wrongs of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and 
Legal Suppression of Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 595, 604 (1999) (arguing that Title VII should be 
extended to prohibit workplace rules that penalize employees for speaking a language other than 
English because “the legal system should treat language as a fundamental identification 
encompassed by each person’s right of personhood”); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the 
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Courts’ rejection of such arguments has been explicit and unequivocal.  In 
Rogers v. American Airlines, for example, the plaintiff argued that she should be 
protected from American Airlines’ no cornrows rule because cornrows were an 
integral part of her identity as a black woman.91  “’[T]he completely braided hair 
style” she asserted “has been and continues to be part of the cultural and 
historical essence of Black American women.’”92  The court, however, denied her 
protection.  Indeed, the district court made clear that Title VII did not protect 
employee expressions of racial identity or prohibit assimilationist workplace 
demands.  Mincing no words, the court explained that “an all-braided hair style . 
. . even if socioculturally associated with a particular race or nationality, is not an 
impermissible basis for distinctions in the application of employment practices 
by an employer.”93  Expressions of racial identity as such were not entitled to 
antidiscrimination protection.94
                                                                                                                                                 
Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving 
English-Only Rules as the Product of Rational Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 
CAL. L. REV. 1347, 1367-72 (1997) (arguing that courts fail to treat Spanish language discrimination 
as national origin discrimination because they do not appreciate the centrality of Spanish 
language in constructing a Latino/a identity).    
91   Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. N.Y. 1981) (Rogers argued that 
“’the completely braided hair style, sometimes referred to as corn rows, has been and continues 
to be part of the cultural and historical essence of Black American women’”). 
92  Id.  
93  Id. at 232.  See also Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at *2 (N.D. Ga. 
May 26, 1981) (holding that employer did not engage in race discrimination when it terminated 
plaintiff for wearing her hair in braids to work with beads at the end of each braid); McBride v. 
Lawstaf, Inc., No. 1:96-cb-0196-cc, 1996 WL 755779, at *1-2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 19, 1996) (holding that 
“[a]s a matter of law, an employer’s grooming policy prohibiting a braided hair style is not ‘an 
unlawful employment practice’ as defined by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2”). 
   
94  See, e.g., Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460, 469 (N.D. Ca. 1978) (dismissing race 
discrimination claim of male employee who refused to shave claiming beard was part of his 
racial identity explaining that “[w]here easily changed physical characteristics are made the basis 
for an individual’s racial identity, it is simply not the law that ‘an asserted racial or cultural 
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Similarly, in Garcia v. Spun Steak Company Hispanic workers who were 
bilingual challenged their employer’s English only workplace rule as a form of 
national origin discrimination.95  The policy they argued should be invalidated 
because “it denies them the ability to express their cultural heritage on the job.”96  
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ group culture claim in no uncertain terms.  
“Title VII . . .  does not,” the court explained, “protect the ability of workers to 
express their cultural heritage at the workplace.”97
Close inspection of the case law reveals then that courts have not adopted 
an anti-assimilationist antidiscrimination principle in either their Title VII sex or 
race jurisprudence.  Quietly in sex cases, and more loudly in race cases, courts 
have rejected claims that Title VII protects individuals as a matter of principle 
from workplace demands that they perform their race or gender in accordance 
with dominant social norms.
   
98
 
   
Nonetheless, employees do at times receive protection from such 
demands.  I turn in the next Parts to consider what alternative antidiscrimination 
principles may explain such protection.  
                                                                                                                                                 
identity cannot legally be the basis for denial of employment.’”); Keys v. Continental Illinois Nat’l 
Bank, 357 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Il. 1973) (denying Title VII protection to plaintiff challenging 
employer’s no beard rule arguing that beards and long sideburns were critical to his racial 
identity).  
95  Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993). 
96  Id. at 1486-87. 
97  Id. at 1487. 
98  As this Part has sought to emphasize, these norms are similar across race and sex cases in that 
they constrain how individuals may express their racial or gender identity, yet they are 
importantly different across race and sex cases in that they hold individuals of all races to a 
uniform cultural code while holding women and men to explicitly divergent codes.  
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II.   AN ANTISUBORDINATION PRINCIPLE  
 The Supreme Court has long been explicit about Title VII’s 
antisubordination project.    The Act’s objective, the Court made clear in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 99 was not only to remove formal barriers to entry, but to 
challenge the social norms and practices that reinforced race and sex based social 
hierarchies.100
 Courts themselves have identified two distinct antisubordination-oriented 
tests for assessing the validity of gender conformity demands.  The first is the 
unequal burdens test, which calls upon courts to strike down gender conformity 
demands that disproportionately burden one sex more than the other.  The 
  In this Part I, consider whether courts’ response to workplace 
conformity demands may reflect this longstanding project.  I consider, in other 
words, whether courts invalidate those workplace conformity demands that 
reinforce the very status-group hierarchies at which Title VII took aim.  
A. Gender Nonconformity 
                                                 
99  401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
100  Id. at 429 (explaining that under Title VII “practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, 
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo 
of prior discriminatory employment practices”).  See also Reva B. Siegel, Discrimination in the Eyes 
of the Law: How Color Blindness Discourse Disrupts and Rationalizes Social Stratification, in 
PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 99, 138 (2001) 
(explaining that “[w]hen we consider how tropes of blindness have been deployed from a 
sociohistoric vantage point we can see that a commitment to alleviating stratification is and has 
been central to the project of antidiscrimination law since the beginning of the Second 
Reconstruction.”); Thomas C. Grey, Cover Blindness, in PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES 85, 89 
(explaining that “modern antidiscrimination law requires identifying those social practices that 
operate as functional equivalents of the old formal restrictions”); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination 
Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 1012 (1986) (noting that 
“[a]lthough much of the scholarship on equal protection doctrine assumes that the anti-
differentiation principle is justifiably the dominant perspective, a comparison of race and sex 
cases, as well as of constitutional and statutory cases, reveals that the anti-subordination principle 
better explains both much of the law and the aversion we feel to race and sex discrimination”). 
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second is the double-bind test, which calls upon courts to reject gender 
conformity demands that make it more difficult for workers of one sex to succeed 
professionally.  In this section I consider how well each principle actually 
explains courts’ sex discrimination jurisprudence.            
1. Unequal Burdens 
Well before Price Waterhouse and its rhetorical ban on sex stereotyping, 
courts relied on an “unequal burdens” test to distinguish acceptable from 
unacceptable gender conformity demands. 101
In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, for example, the district court struck down 
as discriminatory the airline’s requirement that female flight attendants wear 
only contact lenses while male flight attendants could wear eyeglasses or 
contacts.
  Sex-based dress and appearance 
codes were permissible as long as they did not disproportionately burden 
workers of one sex.   
102
                                                 
101  As commonly stated, the unequal burdens test finds discriminatory only those sex-specific 
workplace requirements that impose an unequal burden on female or male workers because of 
their sex.  See, e.g., Michael Selmi,The Many Faces of Darlene Jespersen, 14 DUKE J. OF GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 467, 470 (2007) (explaining that “[s]ince the 1970’s courts have permitted employers to 
require different uniforms for men and women, so long as those uniforms do not impose an 
unequal burden on one sex or the other”); Dianne Avery & Marion Crane, Branded: corporate 
Image, Sexual Stereotyping, and the New Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. OF GENDER L. & POL’Y 13, 42-
43 (2007) (noting that “recently, several federal courts have ruled that sex-specific appearance 
codes are discriminatory only if they impose ‘unequal burdens’ on women and men”).  See also 
Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110 (explaining that “[u]nder established equal burdens analysis, when an 
employer’s grooming and appearance policy does not unreasonably burden one gender more 
than the other, that policy will not violate Title VII”); Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 
855 (9th Cir. 2000) (asserting that “[a] sex-differentiated appearance standard that imposes 
unequal burdens on men and women is disparate treatment that must be justified as a bona fide 
occupational qualification”). 
102  366 F. Supp. 763, 790 (D.D.C. 1973). 
  In Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, the Ninth Circuit struck down as 
discriminatory Continental Airlines’ imposition of weight requirements on 
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female “flight hostesses” but not on male employees in comparable positions.103  
Likewise, in Frank v. United Airlines, the Ninth Circuit struck down United 
Airlines’ sex-based weight requirements limiting male flight attendants to 
maximum weights that corresponded to large body frames but limiting female 
flight attendants to maximum weights that corresponded to medium body 
frames.104  In all three cases, the courts emphasized that the burdens imposed on 
female workers were disproportionate and unequal to those imposed on male 
workers.105
A per se unequal burdens test would demand the elimination of any and 
all gender conformity demands that burden one sex more than the other.  In 
order to assess burdens, courts have suggested that grooming requirements 
should be looked at in total rather than item by item,
  
106
                                                 
103  692 F.2d 602, 603, 610 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that “Continental’s policy of requiring an 
exclusively female category of flight attendants, and not other employees, to adhere to the weight 
restrictions at issue here constitutes discriminatory treatment on the basis of sex”). 
104  216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).  
105  See Laffey, 366 F. Supp. at 774 (emphasizing that the contact lenses which female flight 
attendants were required to wear were more expensive than the eyeglasses which male flight 
attendants were permitted to wear); Gerdom, 692 F.2d at 136 (concluding that the female only 
weight requirement imposed a significantly greater burden on women than men); Frank, 216 F.3d 
at 137 (noting that “[e]ven if United’s weight rules constituted an appearance standard, they 
would still be invalid” because they impose unequal burdens on women and men). 
106  This was in fact a source of contention for the Ninth Circuit panel which first ruled on 
Jespersen’s case.  Compare Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1081 (majority decision) (applying the unequal 
burdens test by comparing the complete set of appearance requirements for women to the 
complete set of requirements for men); with Jespersen, 392 F.3d at 1085-86 (Thomas dissent) 
(arguing that the unequal burdens test should be applied by comparing only the requirement that 
female employees wear makeup against the requirement that male employees do not).  
  and that 
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burdensomeness  should be assessed in terms of the time and money required 
for women and men to comply with their respective requirements.107
Conceived of in this way, the unequal burdens test cannot explain courts’ 
responses to gendered conformity demands.  Courts regularly fail to find sex- 
specific grooming requirements discriminatory even when their burdens are 
unequal in the courts’ own terms.  For example, courts uphold employer 
grooming codes that require men to keep their hair short while imposing no hair 
length or style requirement on women, though it is difficult to believe that a 
short hair requirement for men, matched by no hair length requirement, or any 
other sex-specific grooming requirement, for women, does not impose an 
unequal burden on male employees.  Similarly, it is difficult to believe that a no 
beard requirement for men, when not matched by any kind of general shaving or 
facial grooming requirement for women, does not impose an unequal burden on 
male employees.  Nonetheless courts uphold such sex-specific conformity 
demands against claims of discrimination.
  
108
                                                 
107  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1110 (in ruling against Jespersen on her claim that Harrah’s sex-specific 
grooming requirements imposed on unequal burden on women the court explained that 
“Jespersen did not submit any documentation or any evidence of the relative cost and time 
required to comply with the grooming requirements by men and women”).  See also Selmi, supra 
note 
 
101, at 470 (explaining that an unequal burden “might be in the form of differential costs, or 
even the time that was required to comply with the policy; it might also arise if women were 
required to wear an excessively suggestive outfit.”). 
108  See, e.g., Fagan v. National Cash Register, 481 F. 1115, 1121 (upholding male only short hair 
requirement); Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974) (same); Willingham 
v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (same); Knott v. Missouri 
Pacific Railroad Co., 527 F.2d 1249 (8th Cir. 1975) (same); Thomas v. Firestone Tire and Rubber 
Co., 392 F. Supp. 373, 374 (upholding employer’s no beard policy against sex discrimination 
challenge); Rafford v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Serv., 348 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (same). 
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Indeed, courts regularly uphold conformity demands that impose unequal 
burdens on male and female workers as long as the demands mimic 
conventional, and role appropriate, gender norms. 109  In Craft v. Metromedia,110 
for example, Christine Craft worked as a co-anchor for a television news 
program.  Because of poor ratings and a concern that Craft’s appearance was at 
least partly to blame, Craft was subjected to intensive makeup and wardrobe 
oversight. At one point, Craft was required to use a “clothing calendar” showing 
in detail what she was to wear for each day.111  Craft sued for sex discrimination 
and raised an unequal burdens argument.  She argued that the grooming 
requirements imposed on her by her employer were discriminatory because the 
standards were more onerous and more strictly enforced on women than men.112  
In support of her argument, Craft presented evidence showing that “only 
females were subject to daily scrutiny of their appearance or were ever required 
to change clothes at the station before going on the air.113
                                                 
109  See ROBERT C. POST, PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION 
LAW 38 (2001) (noting that “Title VII decisions distinguish between grooming and dress codes 
that track ‘generally accepted community standards of dress and appearance’ and those that do 
not.  The former are regarded as enforcing a ‘neutral’ baseline that negates any inference of sex 
discrimination”).  
110  Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). 
111  Id. at 1209.  
112  Id. at 1212-13. 
113  Id. at 1212-13. 
  Moreover, the image 
consultant that the station had hired to work with Craft on her appearance 
testified that “she had told Craft not to wear the same outfit more than once 
every three to four weeks because people would start calling in about it; males, 
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however . . . could wear an outfit every week and a suit even twice in the same 
week if combined with a different tie.” 114
Nonetheless, the Craft court found that the television station’s clothing 
and grooming requirements for anchors did not discriminate on the basis of sex.  
In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that the television station was 
simply enforcing the appropriate gender norms for television news anchors.
 
115
Likewise in Jespersen, Darlene Jespersen argued that Harrah’s Personal 
Best standard was discriminatory because it imposed a makeup requirement on 
women but not men.  Although the Ninth Circuit emphasized that Jespersen had 
not presented evidence to the court below showing that Harrah’s sex-based 
grooming requirements imposed an unequal burden on female and male 
bartenders,
   
116 the court seemed predisposed to reject the argument regardless of 
the evidence.  The Personal Best requirements, the court emphasized, simply 
matched conventionally gendered grooming requirements for bartenders and 
hence seemed definitionally to not “unreasonably burden one gender more than 
the other.”117
                                                 
114  Id. at 1214. 
115  As the Court of Appeals noted: “Evidence showed a particular concern with appearance in 
television; the district court stated that reasonable appearance requirements were ‘obviously 
critical’ to KMBC’s economic well-being.” Id. at 1215.  The Court continued that the district court 
did not err “when it concluded that KMBC’s appearance standards were shaped only by neutral 
professional and technical considerations . . .  .”  Id. at 1215-16. 
116   Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111 (“Having failed to create a record establishing that the ‘Personal 
Best’ policies are more burdensome for women than for men, Jespersen did not present any 
triable issue of fact.”). 
117  Id. at 1110.  As the court explained:  
  
‘[w]here, as here, such [grooming and appearance] policies are reasonable and 
are imposed in an evenhanded manner on all employees, slight differences in the 
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These cases suggest, however, a narrower more restrictive version of the 
unequal burdens test that may be at work.  It may be that courts care about 
unequal burdens imposed by gender conformity demands only when the 
demands are not justified by conventional, role-appropriate, gender norms.   
This narrower test would explain why courts were unwilling to strike 
down short hair and no beard requirements for men despite the seemingly 
disproportionate burdens they imposed on men.  Such requirements were 
viewed by courts as simply enforcing conventional professional gender norms.118
It would also explain why courts were willing to strike down the sex-specific 
weight and eyeglass rules imposed on flight attendants by airlines.   The rules 
requiring female flight attendants to be relatively thinner than male attendants 
and to refrain from wearing glasses went beyond both conventional gender 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
appearance requirements for males and females have only a negligible effect on 
employment opportunities.’ Under established equal protection burdens 
analysis, when an employer’s grooming and appearance policy does not 
unreasonably burden one gender more than the other, that policy will not violate 
Title VII. 
Id.  
118  See, e.g., Fagan v. National Cash Register in which the D.C. Court of Appeals upheld a short 
hair requirement for male employees explaining : 
Perhaps no facet of business life is more important than a company’s place in 
public estimation.  That the image created by its employees dealing with the 
public when on company assignment affects its relations is so well known that 
we may take judicial notice of an employer’s proper desire to achieve favorable 
acceptance.  Good grooming regulations reflect a company’s policy in our highly 
competitive business environment.  
481 F.2d 1115, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
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norms and the more professional, less sexualized, role norms for flight 
attendants being imposed on airlines by the courts.119
The narrower test also helps make sense of Carroll v. Talman Federal 
Savings & Loan Association of Chicago
   
120 and O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory,121  
two cases often referred to as exemplars of the unequal burden test.122   In both 
cases employers differentiated between female and male employees through sex-
specific uniform requirements.  In Carroll, female employees of the defendant 
savings and loan association were required to wear a uniform that consisted of 
five basic items: “a color-coordinated skirt or slacks and a choice of a jacket, tunic 
or vest.”123
                                                 
119  See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that “a 
pleasant environment, enhanced by the obvious cosmetic effect that female stewardesses 
provide” is “tangential to the essence of the business involved”). 
120  604 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1979). 
121  656 F. Supp. 263 (S.D. Ohio 1987). 
  Male employees were not required to wear a formal uniform but 
were required to wear “customary business attire” consisting of a “suit, a sport 
jacket and pants, or even a leisure suit as long as it is worn with a shirt and 
122  See Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845 at 855 (citing Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n of Chicago as an example of a case applying the unequal burdens test).  See also Deborah 
Zalesne, Lessons from Equal Opportunity Harasser Doctrine: Challenging Sex-Specific Appearance and 
Dress Codes, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 535 at 540 n. 28 (2007) (citing Carroll v. Talman and 
O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory as cases involving conformity requirements struck down 
under the unequal burdens test); Allison T. Steinle, Appearance and Grooming Standards as Sex 
Discrimination in the Workplace, 56 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 261, 279 n. 137 (2006) (citing O’Donnell v. 
Burlington Coat Factory as a case decided using the unequal burdens case); Hilary J. Bouchard, 
Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co.: Employer Appearance Standards and the Promotion of Gender 
Stereotypes, 58 ME. L. REV. 203, 209 (2006) (citing Carroll v. Talman as a case decided using the 
unequal burdens test); Avery & Crane, supra note 101, at 53 (referring to the “’unequal burdens’ 
test as articulated in Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n of Chicago”); Selmi, supra 
note 101, at 470-71 n. 10 (citing Carroll v. Talman as cases decided using the unequal burden test). 
123  Talman, 604 F.2d at 1028. 
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tie.”124   In O’Donnell v. Burlington Coat Factory, female sales clerks were required 
to wear smocks while male sales clerks were required to wear a shirt and tie.125
The plaintiffs’ challenge, in both cases, was not to the employers’ 
enforcement of conventional gender norms, but to the employers’ different 
treatment of female and male employees in ways that were not demanded by  
these norms.  The female employees in Carroll, for example, did not object to 
wearing female clothing, they objected to being constrained in their choices 
within this category in a way that male employees were not.  Similarly, the 
female employees in O’Donnell did not object to dressing like women, they 
objected to wearing a nongendered smock when their male colleagues were not 
similarly burdened.
   
126
On one level, these cases look like simple anticlassification cases having 
nothing to do with comparative burdens on female and male employees.  The 
problem was that the employers marked female employees as different, not that 
   
                                                 
124  Id. at 1029. 
125  Burlington, 656 F. Supp. at 263. 
126  Indeed the courts in both cases made clear that they did not view the challenged grooming 
codes as simply enforcing traditional gender cultural norms.   In Talman, for example, the court 
explained:  
So long as they find some justification in commonly accepted social norms and 
are reasonably related to the employer’s business needs, such regulations are not 
necessarily violations of Title VII even though the standards prescribed differ 
somewhat for men and women.  However, the situation is different where, as 
here, two sets of employees performing the same functions are subjected on the 
basis of sex to two entirely separate dress codes one including a variety of 
normal business attire and the other requiring a clearly identifiable uniform.  
This different treatment in the conditions of employment for female employees 
cannot be justified by business necessity . . . .  Moreover, the disparate treatment 
is demeaning to women.   
604 F.2d at 1032-33.  In Burlington, the court emphasized that, unlike sex-based hair length 
requirements, the sex-specific smock requirement “finds no justification in accepted social 
norms.”  56 F. Supp. at 266. 
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they imposed disproportionate burdens on them.  Indeed, although the court in 
Carroll did note that the uniform requirement subjected female employees to 
additional costs not born by male employees,127 the O’Donnell court stated 
explicitly that no similar cost disparity existed in that case.128
In Caroll, for example, the court explained, “when some employees are 
uniformed and others are not there is a natural tendency to assume that the 
uniformed women have a lesser professional status than their male colleagues, 
attired in normal business clothes.”
   
Nonetheless, in both cases the courts associated differentiation itself, when 
not rendered invisible by conventional gender norms, with stigmatization of 
women workers.  It was this stigma—rather than time or money--that constituted 
women’s unequal burden.    
 129  Similarly, in O’Donnell, the court 
explained: “[I]t is demeaning for one sex to wear a uniform when members of the 
other sex holding the same positions are allowed to wear professional business 
attire.” 130
                                                 
127  See Talman, 604 F.2d at 1030 (explaining that “[t]he written dress code for female employees 
even discriminates with respect to their compensation, for defendant treats the cost of the two-
piece uniform which it furnishes as income to women employees, withholding income tax on that 
amount from their wages”). 
128  See Burlington, 656 F. Supp. at 266 (stating that “[u]nlike the case at bar, the female employees 
in Talman incurred the initial cost of their uniforms as well as subsequent cleaning and 
maintenance expenses”). 
129 Carroll, 604 F.2d at 1033. 
130  656 F. Supp. at 266. 
    In fact, it probably would not have mattered to the courts in Carroll 
and O’Donnell had it been the male employees who were required to wear 
uniforms and smocks instead of the female workers.  Sex differentiation, not 
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justified by conventional gender norms stigmatizes female workers, regardless of 
how the actual requirements go. 
One would expect a similar finding of discrimination had Christine Craft 
been required to read the news off pink paper while her male co-anchor read off 
blue paper, or had Darlene Jespersen been required to serve her drinks in pink 
glasses while male bartenders served theirs in blue glasses.  The compliance costs 
for female workers would not be any higher than for male workers.  
Nonetheless, the differentiation itself, unjustified by conventional gender norms, 
would stigmatize and thereby burden female workers.131
 In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court did not rely solely on its broad 
rhetoric about sex stereotyping to explain its conclusion that Ann Hopkins was 
the victim of sex discrimination.  The Court also articulated a double-bind 
principle.  An employer could not, the Court made clear, require employees of 
one sex or the other to satisfy gender conformity demands that conflicted with 
professional role demands.   
   
It seems then that while courts are not subjecting gender conformity 
demands to a per se unequal burdens test, they are prohibiting sex-based 
differentiations not justified by conventional gender norms.  This narrower 
unequal burdens test is not, however, the only antisubordination test at work.  
2. Double-Bind 
                                                 
131  Conversely, if the differentiation had been between people born in Idaho and those born in 
Oregon, it would probably not have stigmatized either group.  The stigma seems to come from 
making group identity salient in a context where one group is already assumed to be inferior.     
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Price Waterhouse had created such a double-bind by demanding that 
Hopkins be demure and ladylike when her job required more traditionally male 
attributes.   By refusing to allow Price Waterhouse to punish Hopkins for 
deviating from its feminine ideal, the Supreme Court shielded Hopkins from this 
double bind and facilitated her move up the corporate ladder.132   As the Court 
explained: “An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose 
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible 
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. 
Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”133
 Reading Price Waterhouse as articulating a double-bind principle, rather 
than an anti-assimilation principle, eliminates much of the apparent 
inconsistency in the case law.  Courts upheld short hair and no earring 
requirements for male employees, both before and after Price Waterhouse, because 
they viewed these gender conformity demands as not hindering men’s (or 
women’s) ability to succeed in the workplace.
   
134
                                                 
132  See Mark Kelman, (Why) Does Gender Equity in College Athletics Entail Gender Equality? 7 S. CAL. 
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 63, 80  n. 40 (explaining that in defining “impermissible discrimination  
. . . we focus on the degree to which a particular social practice . . . instantiates and thus reinforces 
a cultural practice that we deem not just detrimental to the historically subordinated group, but 
significantly ‘definitional’ of the group’s second-class status”). 
133  490 U.S. at 251.  See also Dillon v. Frank, 952 F.2d 403 (6th Cir. 1992) (Table text in Westlaw) 
(adopting a double-bind, rather than a broader anti-sex-stereotyping interpretation of Price 
Waterhouse). 
   The Ninth Circuit refused to 
134  See, e.g., Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, 672 N.W.2d  800, 804 (Iowa, 2003); (upholding employer’s 
no earring rule for men and explaining that “Title VII . . . [was] not meant to prohibit employers 
from instituting personal grooming codes which have a de minimis effect on employment”); 
Tavora v. New York Mercantile Exchange, 101 F.3d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1996) (explaining that 
grooming codes requiring that men but not women have short hair have been held not to violate 
Title VII because “such employment policies have only a de minimis effect”); Willingham v. 
Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that employer’s 
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protect Darlene Jespersen from a requirement that she wear makeup—despite 
the Supreme Court’s decision to protect Ann Hopkins from requirements that 
she “’walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear 
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry’”135--because it concluded that 
the demand did not undermine Jespersen’s success as a bartender.136 “The record 
contains nothing,” the court explained, “to suggest the grooming standards 
would objectively inhibit a woman’s ability to do the job.”137
 Although the Ninth Circuit did not explain why it found no double-bind 
in the Jespersen case, the conclusion likely flowed from a tacit acceptance of the 
contemporary performance and display aspects of bartending.  As Dianne Avery 
and Marion Crain have documented, although bartending in the United States 
was an almost exclusively male profession until the 1970s, “within less than two 
decades, bartending was feminized more rapidly and extensively than any other 
predominantly male profession.”
   
138  By 2004, women dominated the profession.  
Along with feminization, came sexualization of the job.139
                                                                                                                                                 
short hair requirement only for male workers did not violate Title VII and explaining that the 
intent of Congress in passing Title VIII was “the guarantee of equal job opportunity for males and 
females” but that a grooming code imposing sex specific hair length requirements “is related 
more closely to the employer’s choice of how to run his business than to equality of employment 
opportunity”). 
135  Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235 (quoting 618 F. Supp. at 1117). 
136  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112. 
137  Id.  
  Increasingly, Crane 
and Avery explain, bartending is dominated by sexy young women for whom 
acting as eye-candy for male customers is as integral to the job as pouring 
138  Avery & Crain, supra note 101, at 92. 
139  Id. at 95 (noting that “[o]f all full-time bartenders in 2004, 95,000 were men and 102,000 were 
women”). 




Indeed, a recent study by psychologist Peter Glick and his colleagues 
suggests that the Ninth Circuit might even have been correct.
  Given this recent feminization of bartending, the court might have 
believed that a makeup requirement would actually enhance, rather than impede 
women’s professional success.  
141  Glick tested the 
effect sexy self-presentations had on perceptions of competence of female 
workers in high-status traditionally male occupations and low-status 
traditionally female occupations.  They had participants rate the competence of a 
woman in a video who they were told was either a receptionist or a manager.  
The woman in the video was dressed in either a deliberately sexy or a neutral 
manner.142  Glick found that sexy dressing resulted in diminished ratings of 
competence for the female manager but not for the receptionist.143
                                                 
140  See id. at 97 (describing the sexing up of bartenders); see also Linda A. Detman, Women Behind 
Bars: The Feminization of Bartending, in JOB QUEUES, GENDER QUEUES: EXPLAINING INROADS INTO 
MALE OCCUPATIONS 252 (Barbara F. Reskin & Patricia A. Roos, eds., 1990) (describing the growth 
of “sex specific demand for female bartenders”).   
141  See Peter Glick, et al., Evaluations of Sexy Women in Low- And High-Status Jobs, 29 PSYCHOLOGY 
OF WOMEN QUARTERLY 389 (2005). 
142  According to the study, “For the neutral condition, the woman wore little makeup, black 
slacks, a turtleneck, a business jacket, and flat shoes. In the sexy condition, the same woman wore 
more makeup and her hair was tousled.  She wore a tight, knee-length skirt, a low-cut shirt with 
a cardigan over it, and high-heeled shoes.” Id. at 391. 
143  Glick and his co-authors found that “participants rated the receptionist as equally competent 
whether she was dressed in a sexy or a neutral manner.  In contrast, participants rated the 
manager as less competent when she dressed in a sexy manner than when she dressed in a 
conservative manner.”  Id. at 393. 
  Sexy dressing, 
in other words, undermined perceptions of competence only for women in high-
status occupations.   
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In its narrowest form the double-bind principle would strike down only 
those gender conformity demands that directly conflict with an employee’s 
professional demands.   Only conformity demands that make it impossible for a 
worker to satisfy her professional demands would be illegal.  Imagine, for 
example, a construction worker required to perform her job duties while 
satisfying a grooming code like that imposed on Jespersen by Harrah’s. 
 The double-bind faced by Hopkins in Price Waterhouse approached, but 
did not quite reach, this per se level.144
The double-bind principle may also, however, be conceived more broadly.  
Rather than requiring a direct conflict between gender conformity demands and 
professional role demands, the double-bind principle may require only a tension 
between the two.   This broader conception would call upon courts to strike 
down conformity demands that make it more difficult, even if not impossible, for 
workers of one sex to also satisfy professional role demands.
  The requirement that Hopkins behave in a 
traditionally feminine manner directly conflicted with role demands calling for 
aggressive and competitive behavior.  Moreover, the equation of aggressiveness 
with bitchiness for women made it virtually impossible for Hopkins to be viewed 
as both competent and collegial.   
 145
                                                 
144  It did not reach the per se level because seven women had been able to satisfy both sets of 
demands and become partners at Price Waterhouse.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233.  
145  In its broad form the double-bind principle resembles and blends with the broad unequal 
burdens test.  This is not surprising since both principles reflect the same core antisubordination 
concerns.   
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 It is this broader double-bind principle that seems to explain courts’ 
particular willingness to check gender conformity demands that sexually 
objectify female workers.  Courts check such demands in a range of cases but 
their reasons for doing so are poorly theorized.  A broad double-bind principle 
provides a unifying thread.   
    Courts check female sexual objectification demands in instances in which 
such demands are used to justify sex-based hiring.  In Wilson v. Southwest, for 
example, the court held that female sexual objectification was not a legitimate job 
requirement for Southwest flight attendants.146 As a result, the court forced 
Southwest to hire men as well as women to the newly desexualized positions.147  
Similarly, in Guardian Capital v. N.Y. State Division of Human Rights, the court 
refused to allow the defendant restaurant to sex-up its business by firing its male 
waiters and replacing them with sexy female waitresses dressed in “alluring 
costumes.”148
Courts check such demands in cases in which women are harassed as a 
result of their objectification.  Rather than simply hold employers liable for the 
harassment, courts routinely deny employers the power to objectify their female 
   
                                                 
146  517 F. Supp. 292, 302 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (explaining with respect to flight attendants and ticket 
agents that “[m]echanical, non-sex-linked duties dominate both these occupations”). 
147  Id. at 304.  See Marc Linder, Smart Women, Stupid Shoes, and Cynical Employers: The Unlawfulness 
and Adverse Health Consequences of Sexually Discriminatory Workplace Footwear Requirements for 
Female Employees, 22 J. CORP. L. 295, 311 (1997) (noting that Southwest got rid of its “high boots 
and hot pants” requirement for flight attendants in 1982). 
148  360 N.Y.S.2d 937, 938 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). 
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employees in the first place.  In EEOC v. Sage Realty,149  for example, Margaret 
Hasselman worked as a lobby attendant in an office building in New York City.  
As part of her job, Hasselman was required to wear a bicentennial uniform, 
which was a red, white and blue poncho-like outfit. The uniform was largely 
open on the sides, but Hasselman was not permitted to wear a shirt under the 
uniform and could only wear blue dance pants on her legs.150  The uniform 
revealed Hasselman’s thighs, portions of her buttocks, and both sides of her  
body.151  When wearing the uniform, Hasselman was subjected to a steady 
stream of sexual comments and gestures by people entering and leaving the 
building.152  Hasselman sued her employer for sexual harassment and won.153  
Yet the court not only found Sage liable for failing to stop the harassment, it also 
ruled that Sage could not require Hasselman to wear a sexually revealing 
uniform.154  The court would not, in effect, permit Sage to explicitly sexualize the 
position of lobby hostess. 155
                                                 
149  507 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
150  Id. at 605. 
151  Id. 
152  Id.  
153  Id. at 609-610 (“In requiring Hasselman to wear the revealing Bicentennial uniform in the 
lobby of 711 Third Avenue, defendants made her acquiescence in sexual harassment by the 
public, and perhaps by building tenants, a prerequisite of her employment as a lobby attendant”). 
154  According to the court, Sage was not justified in putting Hasselman in a sexually revealing 
uniform because sexual titillation was not a BFOQ of the position.  The court explained: “While it 
may well be a [BFOQ] for Sage to require female lobby attendants in its buildings to wear certain 
uniforms designed to present a unique image, in accordance with its philosophy or urban design, 
it is beyond dispute that the wearing of sexually revealing garments does not constitute a 
[BFOQ].” Id. at 611. 
   
155 See also Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 581 (holding that “Title VII is also violated when an 
employer requires a female employee to wear sexually suggestive attire as a condition of 
employment”); EEOC Decision 81-17, 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1791, EEOC Dec. P6757, 
1981 WL 40388 at *2-3 (holding discriminatory an employer’s requirement that a receptionist 
THE ANTIDISCRIMINATION PARADOX 
 
 46 
Finally, courts check such demands in cases in which only female workers 
are held to a sexualized ideal.  Consider again the airline cases in which courts 
struck down dress and appearance requirements for female flight attendants.   In 
Gerdom, Frank and Laffey the challenged grooming codes were part of a larger  
effort by the airlines to make women’s bodies and sexuality part of the good for 
sale.  In Gerdom, for example, Continental openly asserted that it implemented 
the weight program for female flight attendants “to enhance its business image 
by assuring that passengers were served by attractive women.”156  “The purpose 
of the program was . . . to create the public image of an airline which offered 
passengers service by thin, attractive women, whom executives referred to as 
Continental’s ‘girls.’”157  The weight requirements at issue in Frank were a 
holdover from earlier days when United employed only women as flight 
attendants and required them, in addition to being slim, to remain unmarried, to 
refrain from having children, to satisfy general appearance criteria, and to retire 
by the age of 35.158
                                                                                                                                                 
wear a special sexually revealing costume consisting “of a halter-bra top and a mini-skirt with a 
slit running up to [plaintiff’s] thighs” in order to entertain visiting VIPs).   
156  692 F.2d at 603. 
157  Id. at 604. 
158  216 F.3d at 848.  United began hiring male flight attendants after the Fifth Circuit’s decision in 
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), in which the Fifth Circuit held that 
sex was not a bona fide occupational qualification for the position of flight attendant. 
  Similarly, the no eyeglasses rule at issue in Laffey had been 
part of a larger grooming and behavior code at Northwest that required female 
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flight attendants to meet restrictive height and weight requirements, to remain 
unmarried, and to retire from service at age 32.159
A broader and more expansive double bind principle, however, can help 
explain them.  Satisfying sexual objectification demands may make satisfying 
nonsexualized job demands more difficult for female workers in two ways.  First, 
sexualization demands may distract women from the nonsexualized aspects of 
their jobs and diminish the energy they have left to devote to them.
 
Certainly a per se double bind principle cannot explain these cases.  It is 
not impossible for female flight attendants, waitresses and lobby attendants to 
perform the technical functions of their jobs while looking sexy—particularly if 
the employer prevents actual harassment.   
160  Second, 
sexualization demands may distract customers and coworkers and diminish their 
perceptions of the competence of female workers.161
                                                 
159  366 F. Supp. at 773-75.  Although these cases are regularly cited as exemplars of the unequal 
burdens test, I believe the cases are better understood as reflecting a broad double bind 
prohibition.  
160 See Barbara Fredrickson et al., That Swimsuit Becomes You: Sex Differences in Self-Objectification, 
Restrained Eating, and Math Performance, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 269 (1998) (finding 
that women wearing a swimsuit while taking a challenging math test performed worse than 
those wearing a sweater while taking the test). 
  Courts may protect female 
workers from sexualization demands precisely because they make it more 
difficult for women to satisfy the other demands of their jobs.  
161  See Glick, supra note 141 (finding that sexy dressing diminished perceptions of competence of 
female manager); Brad J. Bushman & Angelica M. Bonacci, Violence and Sex Impair Memory for 
Television Ads, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 557 (2002) (finding that after viewing sexual images on 
television, people of both sexes had impaired memory for the substance of whatever came next); 
Sandra Forsythe et al., Influence of Applicant’s Dress on Interviewer’s Selection Decisions, 70 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 374 (1985) (finding that dressing female managerial job candidates in feminine 
clothing caused them to be perceived as less competent for managerial positions).  
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Certainly, courts do not seek to eliminate female sexuality or the female 
body as gaze object from all jobs.  They recognize that women’s bodies and 
appearance may be an important part of the experience being sold in many 
service sector jobs.162
In the race context, as in the sex context, scholars have challenged 
workplace conformity demands by arguing that they impose an unequal burden 
on minority workers.  Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati, most notably, argue that 
many workplace conformity demands impose unequal burdens on minority 
  Nonetheless, broad double-bind concerns may help 
explain why courts are particularly suspicious of sexual objectification demands 
for female employees and why they use Title VII to keep sex out of many jobs 
and minimized in others.   
Antisubordination concerns, as expressed through the unequal burden or 
double bind test can, then, help explain when and why courts protect workers 
from gender conformity demands.  Courts invalidate those gender conformity 
demands that reinforce sex inequality in particular ways.  
B. Racial Nonconformity 
Antisubordination concerns have not, however, resulted in protection of 
racial minorities from culturally white workplace norms.  In this section, I 
examine why.   
 1. Unequal Burdens 
                                                 
162  See, e.g., Craft, 766 F.2d at 1214 (noting that some focus on appearance for new anchors was 
unavoidable “[s]ince television is a visual medium”); Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1111-12 (noting that 
bartenders’ appearance was important because Harrah’s was part of the “entertainment 
industry”). 
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workers because the demands are coded white and minority workers must do 
extra work to comply with them.163
Meanwhile, the narrower unequal burdens test, which courts did use to 
strike gender conformity demands in sex cases, simply generates no comparable 
protection in race cases.  In the sex context, courts were willing to strike down 
conformity demands that distinguished between the sexes in ways not justified 
by conventional gender norms, regardless of whether the burdens imposed were 
equal or unequal.  In the race context, however, conformity demands never 
distinguish between the races in this way.  Conformity demands are always 
  Yet this is precisely the kind of unequal 
burden that courts did not care about in the sex context.  It is not surprising then 
that they also do not care about it the race context.   
Courts deciding racial discrimination cases, like those deciding sex 
discrimination cases, refuse to adopt a per se unequal burdens test for conformity 
demands.  Courts do not care about conformity demands that disproportionately 
burden members of one group in terms of the time, money, and energy costs of 
compliance as long as the demands match conventional professional norms.  
White middle class dress and behavior norms define professional norms.  This is 
precisely the problem according to many race discrimination scholars.  
Nonetheless, it is also what renders any disparity in the compliance costs for 
white and minority workers both invisible and immaterial to courts. 
                                                 
163  Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note 5, at 1269 (explaining that minority workers 
must do extra work to overcome expectations of poor fit); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The 
Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 701, 717-18 (2001) (describing how racially loaded 
workplace norms may disadvantage minority employees). 
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uniform.  In race cases, in other words, the burdens that exist are not ones that 
courts recognize, and the burdens courts recognize are not ones that exist.  As a 
result, the unequal burdens test imposes no check on racial conformity demands. 
2. Double Bind 
The double-bind principle is similarly impotent against racial conformity 
demands.  As an initial matter, racial conformity demands do not place workers 
in the kind of narrow double-bind at issue in Price Waterhouse.  This difference is 
due to the different ways in which assimilation demands constrain female and 
minority workers.   
Gendered assimilation demands require female workers to play to a 
distinctly feminine code.  Women are expected to look and act like women, men 
are required to look and act like men, and these are not the same.   Racially 
loaded conformity demands, in contrast, require minority workers to play to a 
unitary code—one that is applied to all workers regardless of race.  The effect of 
this formal neutrality is that minority workers never face the kind of direct 
conflict between cultural conformity demands and professional demands that 
female workers sometimes do.   
 Consider, for example, a black man facing the same partnership hurdle as 
Ann Hopkins.  He is an associate at a large accounting firm being considered for 
partnership.  He is evaluated, as Hopkins was, based in part on his compliance 
with cultural conventions and with more role-specific demands.  In accord with 
cultural conventions, he is expected to speak standard grammatically correct 
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English, wear relatively expensive but understated clothes, and keep his hair and 
beard short and clean cut.  In accord with professional role expectations, he is 
expected to project strength, authority, and competence.  The cultural conformity 
demands, rather than being in conflict with role demands, as they were for 
Hopkins, work in concert with them.  Indeed, satisfying cultural assimilation 
demands actually increases the likelihood that the minority candidate will also 
be viewed as satisfying role demands. 
 Certainly one could conceive of a double-bind scenario in the race context 
that parallels that faced by Ann Hopkins in the sex context.  Imagine a world, 
perhaps in the not too distant past, in which cultural conformity demands for 
blacks and whites, just as for women and men, were explicitly different.  Blacks 
were expected to be deferential, referential and subservient to whites.  Whites, at 
least white men, were expected to be confident and assertive.  Consider now the 
black applicant for partnership.  In order to satisfy the role demands of a 
successful accountant, the candidate must project strength, authority and 
competence.  Now, however, the applicant’s cultural conformity demands are in 
direct conflict with professional role demands.  If the black man satisfies role 
demands, he fails his cultural conformity demands and is likely to be viewed as 
an uppity and arrogant black man—much as Ann Hopkins was viewed as a 
bitchy woman.  If he satisfies the cultural conformity demands, he almost 
certainly fails his role demands.  Double-binding assimilation demands of this 
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sort would constitute actionable race discrimination.164
 Another way to see the sex-race difference with respect to a narrow 
double-bind prohibition is to focus on the market consequences for women and 
minorities of assimilation demands.  While assimilation demands tend to help 
women in low level jobs, they tend to hurt women in high level jobs.
  In practice, however, this 
is not how assimilationist demands operate on racial minorities. 
165
 The broad double-bind principle may seem to hold more promise for 
checking racial conformity demands.  One could argue that just as sexualized 
conformity demands double-bind female workers by distracting their attention 
from the nonsexualized aspects of their jobs, so too do culturally white 
  Women 
in high-level jobs receive market rewards by resisting traditionally female 
assimilation demands.  The demands double-bind them.  In contrast, assimilation 
demands always and only help minority workers satisfy professional role 
demands.  There is no professional or market penalty for minority workers for 
abiding by such demands and no market reward for minorities who resist 
assimilationist demands.  
                                                 
164  They would be actionable not only because of their subordinating effect, but also because 
race-specific demands, unlike sex-specific demands, are always illegal.   
165  See, e.g., Glick, supra note 141 (finding that sexy dressing diminished perceptions of 
competence for women in traditionally male but not traditionally female occupations); JENNIFER 
L. PIERCE, GENDER TRIALS: EMOTIONAL LIVES IN CONTEMPORARY LAW FIRMS 114 (1995) (noting that 
“women lawyers are placed in a constant double bind between the requirements of the role of the 
‘good woman’ and the role of the adversary”);  ROSEMARY PRINGLE, Male Secretaries, in DOING 
“WOMEN’S WORK”: MEN IN NONTRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS 133 (Christine L. Williams, ed., 1993) 
(describing how secretaries came to be defined in the twentieth century in “family and sexual 
terms”); ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN 
FEELING (1983) (explaining that “[f]or the flight attendant, the smiles are a part of her work”). 
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conformity demands double-bind racial minorities by diminishing the attention 
such workers have left to expend on other aspects of their jobs.     
 The fact that courts have not used Title VII to protect minority workers 
from racially loaded conformity demands may mean that courts are simply 
unwilling to adopt as broad a double-bind principle in the race context as they 
do in the sex context.  The difference in coverage may, in other words, be due to 
doctrinal differences in the two contexts.   
Alternatively, however, it may be that I have not yet fully specified the 
broad double-bind principle at work in the sex cases.  It may be that courts care 
about the double-bind created by sexualization demands because the double-
bind is structural rather than personal.  Sexualization demands undermine all 
female workers both by taking their attention away from nonsexualized skill 
development and by diminishing how seriously they are taken by others.  The 
double-bind does not depend on the specific subjectivity of any particular female 
worker.   
The double-bind imposed on racial minorities by normatively white 
conformity demands is different.  The extent to which a minority worker is 
distracted and disadvantaged at work by having to conform to culturally white 
norms depends on the subjectivity of the particular employee.  It depends in 
particular on the degree to which the minority employee is already comfortable 
or identified with white norms.  For a minority worker who is fully acculturated 
to white middle class norms, such conformity demands would not impose a 
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double-bind.  Courts may not then be rejecting the broad double-bind 
antidiscrimination principle in race cases, but simply not finding conformity 
demands that double-bind.   
In sum, antisubordination concerns inhere both in courts’ sex and race 
discrimination jurisprudence.  Yet racial conformity demands do not subordinate 
minority workers in the same ways that gender conformity demands subordinate 
women.  As a result, the antisubordination principles that have resulted in some 
protections from conformity demands in sex cases yield no comparable 
protection in race cases.   
Nonetheless, neither an unequal burden nor a double-bind test fully 
explains courts’ response to workplace conformity demands.  I turn in the next 
Part to a third antidiscrimination theory that may be doing the additional work.  
 
III. A STATUS PRINCIPLE 
 Courts and scholars often emphasize that Title VII prohibits 
discrimination based on status not conduct.166
                                                 
166  See  Charity Williams, Misperceptions Matter: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Protects 
Employees from Discrimination Based on Misperceived Religious Status, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 357, 360 
(“Immutable traits are characteristics of status whereas mutable traits are considered conduct, 
and ‘only discrimination based on status is forbidden’”); Gear Rich, supra note 
  In this Part, I examine whether 
this distinction between protected status and unprotected conduct can further 
explain courts’ conformity decisions.  I consider, in other words, whether courts 
5, at 1200-01 
(describing the “involuntary/voluntary or status/conduct distinction in Title VII cases”); Engle, 
supra note 6, at 353 (“for the most part . . . a line between status and volitional conduct separated 
employer actions that are prohibited by Title VII from those that fall under the discretion of the 
employer, outside of Title VII’s scope”). 
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prohibit conformity demands that penalize traits that they consider to be more 
status-like than conduct-like. 
A.  Gender Nonconformity 
The traditional and most narrow definition of status is ascriptive status.  
Ascriptive status is determined at birth, is not easily changed, and does not 
depend on individual conduct.167   Sex and race are paradigmatic types of 
ascriptive status.  Both are assigned at birth based on legal and medical criteria, 
are highly stable, and are determined independent of any conduct on the part of 
the individual.  Indeed, it is to their ascriptive status that courts generally point 
in explaining why discrimination based on race and sex is prohibited.168
A prohibition on discrimination based on ascriptive status cannot help 
explain when courts are willing to check gender conformity demands.  This is 
because none of the gender conformity demands employers impose on 
employees penalize status of this kind.  For example, when employers 
discriminate against men with effeminate mannerisms, they do so because of the 
 
                                                 
167  Manfred Rohbinder, Status, Contract & the Welfare State, 23 STAN. L. REV. 941, 954 (1971) (“The 
development from status to contract is more accurately ‘a movement from ‘ascriptive’ status, 
fixed by birth and family rights, to status acquired on the basis of individual achievement’”); 
Douglas Dribben, Homosexuals and the Military: Strange Bedfellows, 57 UMKC L. REV. 123, 125 
(1988) (“The current suspect classes recognized by the Supreme Court are race and national 
origin, are defined by genetics and do not share any conduct or desire for a particular conduct 
peculiar to the class.  It is because of the very nature of their trait-immutable, unchosen, and 
unrelated to any action on their part—that they have received suspect class status.”). 
168  Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 (1972) (suggesting heightened scrutiny 
is triggered by discrimination based on “status of birth”); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 
(1976) (“the legal status of illegitimacy . . . is, like race or national origin, a characteristic 
determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual”).  See also FORD, 
RACIAL CULTURE, supra note 7, at 2 (arguing that civil rights law “properly focuses on ascriptive 
racial status, not on a metaphysics of ancestry or the unplumbed depth of subjective identity.”). 
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employee’s actual conduct, not because of their condition at birth.  Indeed, even 
Gender Identity Disorder does not look like a purely ascriptive status.  Although 
there are theories that GID may have its origin in pre-natal brain development,169 
the condition cannot be identified at birth—for reasons that probably go beyond 
the inadequacy of current medical technology—but requires examination of the 
person’s behavior.170  Individuals are not diagnosed with GID, and certainly are 
not discriminated against because of it, without regard to conduct.  A narrow 
focus on protecting ascriptive status cannot then explain why courts protect men 
who are effeminate and those diagnosed with GID from being penalized for 
violating masculine conformity demands.171
                                                 
169 See J. MICHAEL BAILEY, THE MAN WHO WOULD BE QUEEN: THE SCIENCE OF GENDER-BENDING 
AND TRANSSEXUALISM 169 (2003) (explaining that “femininity in boys and homosexuality in men 
are probably caused by incomplete masculinization of the brain during sexual differentiation”); 
Leslie M. Lothstein, The Scientific Foundations of Gender Identity Disorders, in MENTAL DISORDERS IN 
THE NEW MILLENIUM: BIOLOGY AND FUNCTION 246 (Thomas Plante, ed., 2006) (“Newer findings . . 
. suggest that brain circuitry and specific brain nuclei may be responsible for organization and 
arousal, gender identity, sexual orientation, and love relationships”).  
170  DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS- IV (2000) (DSM-IV) defines 
GID as follows: 
“I.  Having a strong and persistent cross-gender identification (not merely a desire for any 
perceived cultural advantages of being the other sex. 
II.  Having persistent discomfort with his or her sex or sense of appropriateness in the gender role 
of that sex. 
III.  The disturbance is not concurrent with a physical intersex condition. 
IV.  The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairments in social, occupational, 
or other important areas of functioning.”  
See also, Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of Gender 
Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 731 (2005) (arguing that in order to get a 
medical diagnosis of GID, and access to a sex change operation, individuals are required to 
possess the conventional gender attributes of their psychological gender).  
171  Indeed, it is courts’ allegiance to an ascriptive notion of status that helps explain courts’ 
previous unwillingness to protect transsexuals from discrimination.  See Holloway v. Arthur 
Andersen, 566 F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Holloway has not claimed to have been treated 
discriminatorily because she is male or female, but rather because she is a transsexual who chose 
to change her sex”). 
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Ascriptive status is not, however, the only definition of status that courts 
have used to justify protecting individuals from discrimination.  In Robinson v. 
California,172 for example, the Supreme Court held that the state of California 
could not criminalize the status of being a drug addict.173
The Court suggested the importance of lack of control of the first type 
when it noted that addiction is “an illness which may be contracted innocently or 
involuntarily.”
  Status in this case did 
not mean ascriptive status.   Although individuals are sometimes born addicted 
to drugs, the status of drug addiction is more often the result of future conduct 
by the individual.  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Robinson suggests then a broader 
definition of the kind of status that may be deserving of protection.  In Robinson, 
the Court emphasized that addiction was a condition over which an individual 
had little control.  More precisely, the Court focused on two types of lack of 
control—lack responsibility for acquiring the condition, and lack of ability to 
change the condition.   
174
                                                 
172  Robinson v. Cal., 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
173  Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67 (explaining that “we deal with a statute which makes the ‘status’ 
of narcotic addiction a criminal offense” and holding that “a state law which imprisons a person 
thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the State 
or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
174  370 U.S. at 667. 
  An addict, the Court suggests, is not responsible for and could 
not control the condition of being addicted.  As Larry Alexander explains: “The 
Court’s rationale was that ‘being’ addicted was not a voluntary act, and that the 
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Eighth Amendment required that punishment not be based on a status that could 
be acquired involuntarily”175  Of course, as Mark Kelman has argued, a finding 
of lack of responsibility for one’s condition is often a function of the time frame 
one examines.176
Even if we should not blame people for being sick, we may well 
blame them for becoming sick.  The addict may seem blameless in 
the narrow time frame, but in a broader time frame he may well be 
blameworthy.  Certainly, it is not at all uncommon or bizarre for a 
parent to blame (and punish) a child who goes out of the house in a 
storm without adequate raingear for getting a cold, even though the 
same parent would not punish the child for the ‘status’ of being 
ill.
   One may not be able to control the fact that one becomes 
addicted to narcotics, but often one can control whether one takes such narcotics 
in the first place.  Or, to use Kelman’s own example:  
177
The court suggested the importance the second type of lack of control 
when it compared persecution of a person for being a drug addict with 
persecution of a person for being “mentally ill, or a leper, or  . . . afflicted by a 
    
 
Nonetheless, important to the Court’s conception of status seems to be a sense 
that, at least in a narrow time frame, the individual is not responsible for the 
condition that defines their status.    
                                                 
175  See Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr. Jekyll, and the Due Process of Proof, 1996 S.CT. REV. 
191, 197 n. 76 (“In Robinson the Court held that the Eighth Amendment barred California’s 
making addiction to narcotics a crime.  The Court’s rationale was that ‘being’ addicted was not a 
voluntary act, and that the Eighth Amendment required that punishment not be based on a status 
that could be acquired involuntarily”);  
176  Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 591, 
600 (1981) (noting that “[t]he tensions of time-framing are evident in the status versus conduct 
distinction” and  
177  Id. at 601-02. 




This broad conception of status, defined by a lack of individual control 
rather than an absence of relevant conduct, does help to explain courts’ emerging 
protection of transsexual crossdressers from requirements that they satisfy the 
grooming code of their biological sex.   Indeed, such protection followed, and 
seemed dependent upon, the medicalization of gender identity disorders.
  What was unfair about persecution in all cases, it seemed, 
was that the conditions were not ones which the individual could readily change 
or eliminate.  
 179
                                                 
178  370 U.S. at 666. 
   In 
Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, for example, the first circuit court case to protect a 
transsexual crossdresser, the court emphasized that Smith had been diagnosed 
with “Gender Identity Disorder” which, the court noted, “the American 
Psychiatric Association characterizes as a disjunction between an individual’s 
179  As Michael Selmi has noted “it is now possible that within the Sixth Circuit only transsexuals 
are protected under the sex stereotyping theory.”  Selmi, supra note 101, at 477.  The Sixth Circuit 
has not been alone in expanding protection for transsexuals.  See Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. 
Supp.2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006); Schwenck v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000); Mitchell v. 
Axcan Scandipharm, Inc., No. Civ. A 05-243 2006 WL 456173 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2006); Kash v. 
Maricopa Cty. Community College Dist., No. 02-1531-PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954, at *2 (D. Ariz. 
June 3, 2004); Tronetti v. TLC Health Net Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 
22757935 (W.D. NY, Sept., 26, 2003); Doe, 2001 WL 34350174, at *2.  Cf. Holloway v. Arthur 
Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977); Doe v. U.S. Postal Service, 1985 WL 9446, at 
*2 (D.D.C. 1985); Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 2005 WL 150561 (D. Utah, June 24, 2005); Oiler v. 
Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La. 2002); Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Cox v. Denny’s Inc., 1994 WL 1317785 (M.D. Fla., Dec. 22, 
1999); Underwood v. Archer Management Services, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 96, 98 (D.D.C. 1994); Doe v. 
United Consumer Fin. Serv., No. 1:01-CV-1112, 2001 WL 34350174, at *2 (N.D. Ohio, Nov. 9, 
2001); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984); Sommers v. Budget Mktg, Inc., 
667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 
1977); Doe v. U.S. Postal Service, 1985 WL 9446, at *2 (D.D.C. 1985).  Antidiscrimination 
protection for transsexual and transgender employees continues to vary widely.  See Koch & 
Bales, supra note 9. 
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sexual organs and sexual identity.”180  The court went on to explain that Smith’s 
decision to “express a more feminine appearance on a full-time basis” was “in 
accordance with international medical protocols for treating GID.”181  The court’s 
medicalization of GID rendered it, like addiction, a status beyond individual 
control and worthy of protection. 182
The broad conception of status also helps explain courts’ protection of 
effeminate men (and masculine women) from harassment stemming from their 
gender nonconformity.  In the effeminate men cases the plaintiffs are being 
harassed not (at least not wholly) because of some discrete characteristic over 
which they have easy control--like what they wear-- but because of the complex 
and highly personal way in which they inhabit their body.  They are being 
harassed because of a combination of intangible factors--how they walk, talk, 
stand and move--which determine their self presentation and the reactions they 
receive from others.   For most people the manner in which they engage in this 
conduct is unconscious, the product of natural inclinations rather than conscious 
practice.  Even for those who do practice a particular mode of talking, standing, 
   
                                                 
180  378 F.3d 566, 568 (6th Cir. 2004). 
181  Id. at 568.  Likewise, in Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that Barnes 
was a pre-operative transsexual who, by the time his case was decided, had transitioned from 
male to female.  401 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2005).   
182  Indeed, although the Smith court relied on the broad anti sex stereotyping rhetoric of Price 
Waterhouse to explain its protection of transsexual crossdressers, the court neither disavows nor 
even addresses its own prior case law denying protection to nontranssexual workers challenging 
sex-based clothing and grooming requirements.  See, e.g., Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Company, 549 
F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977), upholding a hair length restriction on male but not female employees 
against a claim of sex discrimination. It distances itself only from pre-Price Waterhouse cases 
denying such protection to transsexuals.   378 F.3d. at 572-73 (explaining that the logic of these 
“pre-Price Waterhouse cases from other federal appellate courts holding that transsexuals, as a 
class, are not entitled to Title VII protection” have been “eviscerated”).    
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and moving, such conduct eventually becomes automatic and involuntary--and 
difficult to alter.   
Consider, for example, the harassment suffered by Antonio Sanchez in 
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises.183  Sanchez, a food server, was harassed 
for “walking and carrying his serving tray ‘like a woman.’”184  Whatever it was 
about Sanchez’s movement that made Sanchez’s co-workers refer to him as “she” 
and “her”185
Consider also the harassment faced by sixteen year old H. Doe in Doe v. 
City of Belleville, Illinois.
 was not susceptible to easy identification or quick fix.  Indeed, the 
harassers themselves would probably have struggled to describe precisely what 
about Sanchez’s movements they found objectionable.  Even if they could, it 
would have been extremely difficult for Sanchez to alter his walk and 
movements so as to eliminate the offending affect.  Doing so is not like changing 
one’s shirt.  It is more like changing one’s way of being in the world. 
186  H. was subjected to repeated physical and verbal 
harassment focused on his inadequate masculinity.187  Certainly, H.’s earring was 
a focal point of harassment.188  Yet it is unlikely that the harassment would have 
ceased, or never started, if H. had simply removed the earring.189
                                                 
183  256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001). 
184  Id. at 870. 
185  Id. at 870. 
186  119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1996). 
187  In addition to other incidents of physical and verbal harassment, H. Doe was regularly called 
“queer” and “fag,” was asked “Are you a boy or a girl?” and was referred to by his primary 
harasser as his “bitch.”  Id. at 566-67. 
188  Id. at 567. 
189  Indeed, H.’s brother J. was also harassed, albeit less severely, despite not wearing an earring.  
Id. at 566. 
  The 
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harassment was prompted not by a discrete easily identifiable action on H.’s 
part.  It was prompted and driven by the gestalt of how H. presented himself--
the way in which he occupied and moved his body.190  As was the case for 
Sanchez, identifying what exactly it was about H.’s self-presentation, much less 
getting H. to change it, would likely be impossible.  The harassment looks, as a 
result, distinctly status-like.191
In Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc.,
   
A broad status-based antidiscrimination principle not only explains why 
courts provide protection to transsexual crossdressers and effeminate men, but it 
also explains why courts continue to deny protection to nontranssexual gender 
benders who violate specific dress and grooming requirements.  In such cases, 
which involve clearly defined requirements and no medical illnesses, courts view 
compliance as a matter of personal preference.  Indeed, it is this choice and 
control, in addition to the lack of subordinating effect discussed previously, that 
courts repeatedly stress in cases upholding sex-specific grooming codes.   
192
                                                 
190  As the court explained: “H. Doe [did] not su[e][ ] Belleville in order to challenge a workplace rule that 
forbade him from wearing an earring,” he sued because “his gender had something to do with the 
harassment heaped upon him.”  Id. at 582.  
 for example, the Iowa Supreme Court 
upheld an employer’s right to terminate a male employee for refusing to remove 
his ear stud emphasizing that the requirement was one with which Pecenka 
191  Devon Carbado, Mitu Gulati and Gowri Ramachandran have offered a slightly different 
status-oriented reading of the effeminate men harassment cases, one focused on the status of 
homosexuality rather than gender.   They contend that by using the sex stereotyping rhetoric of 
Price Waterhouse to protect effeminate men from harassment, courts “quite possibly, [ ] were 
engaging in subversive judging—namely, enacting a minor rebellion against the Constitutional 
refusal to provide any protection against sexual orientation discrimination.” Carbado, Gulati & 
Ramachandran, supra note 9, at 137. 
192  Pecenka v. Fareway Stores, Inc., 672 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa, 2003). 
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could easily comply.  “Wearing an ear stud is not an immutable characteristic,” 
the court noted.193  “Pecenka can remove his ear stud or cover it with a 
bandage.”194  Similarly, in Austin v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, the district court upheld 
an employer’s sex-specific requirement that male employees keep their hair 
above the collar emphasizing that “hair length is not an immutable characteristic, 
for it may be changed at will.”195  “Discrimination based on factors of personal 
preference” the court explained, “do not necessarily restrict employment 
opportunities and are thus not forbidden.”196
Similarly, in Jespersen the court emphasized the personal choice involved 
in Jespersen’s refusal to wear makeup.  The court explained: “We respect 
Jespersen’s resolve to be true to herself and to the image that she wishes to 
project to the world.  We cannot agree, however, that her objection to the 




                                                 
193  Id. at 805. 
194  Id. at 805.  The court also emphasized that the no earring for men rule did not reinforce 
women’s or men’s subordination in the workplace.  The court noted, “Nor does [plaintiff] 
contend that the unwritten personal grooming code perpetuates a sexist or chauvinistic attitude 
in employment that significantly affects his employment opportunities.”  Id. at 805.  See also 
Lockhart v. La.-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 603 (Or. 1990) (upholding no facial jewelry rule for male 
but not female employees explaining that “[o]nly those distinctions between the sexes which are 
based on immutable, unalterable, or constitutionally protected personal characteristics are 
forbidden”). 
195  20 F. Supp.2d 1254, 1258 (N.D. Ind. 1998). 
196  Id. at 1256.  Like the court in Pecenka, the Austin court also emphasized that the sex-specific 
grooming requirement at issue did not raise antisubordination-oriented concerns.  As the court 
explained: “The objective of Title VII is to equalize employment opportunities.  Consequently, 
discrimination based on either immutable sex characteristics or constitutionally protected 
activities such as marriage or child rearing violate Title VII because they present obstacles to the 
employment of one sex that cannot be overcome . . . .”  Id. at 1256. 
197  Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1112. 
  Sex-specific grooming requirements, the court emphasized, 
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did not become illegal simply because they were “personally offensive” to the 
plaintiff.198
 In the race context, the same broad status-based antidiscrimination 
principle helps to explain one of the few types of conformity demands that courts  
readily treat as racially discriminatory.  These are demands that black men with 
Psuedofolliculitis barbae (PFB) comply with no-beard requirements.
  
For Darlene Jespersen, Michael Pecenka and James Austin, compliance 
with their employer’s conformity demands was physically easy and relatively 
uncomplicated.  Noncompliance was, as the courts suggested, largely a matter of 
choice and personal preference, and did not, as a result look status-like.   
Courts’ protection of gender nonconforming behavior that looks status-
like helps complete the picture of courts’ Title VII sex discrimination 
jurisprudence.  Such jurisprudence does not reflect a right to engage in gender 
nonconformity as such.  It does, however, reflect courts’ commitments to ending 
status discrimination and group subordination which do sometimes themselves 
require protection of gender nonconforming conduct.      
B. Racial Nonconformity 
199
                                                 
198  Id. at 112. 
199  PFB is a skin condition that makes shaving painful.  As the court explained in Richardson v. 
Quik Trip Corp.:  
Psuedofolliculitis barbae . . . is a facial skin condition that afflicts certain persons 
with curly or kinky hair follicles.  After shaving, the curved hair follicles cause 
the already curly hair to curve back into contact with the skin surface, and pierce 
and re-enter the skin, forming a pseudofollicle.  The pseudofollicle becomes 
inflamed, and painful papules and pustules result around the pseudofollicles 
and, if untreated, cause scarring, hyperpigmentation, and disfigurement.   
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 The medical diagnosis of PFB as a disease makes it look a lot like GID—a 
condition for which the individual is blameless and over which he lacks easy 
control.  Indeed, critical to plaintiffs’ success in such cases has been their ability 
to convince a court of the physical pain and hardship associated with shaving 
because of this racially correlated condition.200
In Richardson v. Quik Trip, for example, the plaintiff was fired for refusing 
to shave his beard in violation of the company’s grooming code.
    
201  The plaintiff 
sued alleging that enforcement of the policy against black men like him who 
suffered from PFB constituted race discrimination.  The court agreed 
emphasizing that for PFB sufferers like the plaintiff shaving was 
“insufferable.”202
                                                                                                                                                 
591 F. Supp. 1151, 1153-54 (D.C. Iowa, 1984).  See also Univ. of Md. v. Boyd, 612 A.2d 305, 314-15 
(Md. 1992) (referring to expert testimony in the record that PFB makes shaving very 
uncomfortable).  
  PFB affects a significant proportion of black men and affects almost exclusively black 
men.  See Quik Trip, 591 F. Supp. at 1154 (“PFB is an immutable condition that, with few 
exceptions, afflicts only male blacks”); EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 56 (D. Colo. 1981) 
(“[O]f the total black male population, 25% are unable to shave regularly without serious, painful 
disorders of the skin of the face”); Boyd, 619 A.2d at 316 (explaining that “PFB is predominantly 
found in the African American male population and that the wearing of a beard is the most 
common cure”). 
200  The fact that the burden imposed is both physical and race related is critical to the success of 
these claims.  See Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 35, 43 (D.C. Va. 1976) (noting that 
“[t]he evidence adduced in the instant case does establish that the ‘no beard’ policy can act to 
disqualify an otherwise qualified black from employment solely on the basis of a genetic 
characteristic peculiar to his race”).   
201  591 F. Supp. 1151 (S.D. Iowa 1984). 
202   Id. at 1155. 
  Similarly, in University of Maryland at Baltimore v. Boyd, the 
plaintiff, a black man with PFB, claimed that, as applied to him, a no-beard 
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requirement for university police officers was racially discriminatory.203  The 
Maryland Court of Special Appeals agreed.204  In reaching its conclusion, the 
court emphasized the pain associated with shaving for PFB sufferers and the 
particular severity of the plaintiff’s own case.205
In contrast, when compliance costs are low, courts refuse to use 
antidiscrimination law to protect workers from no-beard requirements.   In such 
cases, nonconformity looks less like a matter of racial status and more like a 
matter of personal choice.  Consider, for example, the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in 
Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska.
   
206  Bradley involved a case brought by the EEOC on 
behalf of Langston Bradley, an African American man who suffered from PFB.207  
Bradley had worked as a delivery man for Domino’s Pizza until he was fired for 
failing to comply with the company’s no-beard policy.208
                                                 
203  612 A.2d 305 (Md. 1992).  The plaintiff in Boyd filed his claim under Maryland state law, 
though, as the court notes, Maryland’s relevant antidiscrimination statute “’is modeled on Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.’”  Id. at 314 (citation omitted). 
204  Id. at 316 (“we find the hearing examiner’s conclusion, that the University’s policy adversely 
affects the African American male population afflicted with PFB, is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record.”). 
205  Id. at 314 (noting that “[e]xpert witnesses testified that the symptoms of PFB, skin irritation, 
pus and blood filled sores, and scarring, are brought on by shaving and that some sufferers of 
PFB must abstain from shaving”).  The Court further noted that the Maryland Commission on 
Human Relations found that “Mr. Boyd’s ‘PFB condition impaired his appearance, scarred his 
face and created an externally visible disfigurement unless he wore a beard . . . .”  Id at 317.  
Moreover, the court concluded that “[t]here is substantial evidence to prove that the severity of 
Mr. Boyd’s PFB condition significantly impairs his ability to socialize, considered to be a major 
life activity, and, therefore, is physically handicapping to him.” Id. at 318.  Although the court 
discussed this particular evidence in the part of the case addressing plaintiff’s disability 
discrimination claim rather than his race discrimination claim it seems likely that the evidence 
also influenced the court’s analysis of plaintiff’s race discrimination claim. 
206  7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993). 
207  Id. at 796. 
208  Id. 
  The EEOC sought an 
injunction requiring Domino’s to recognize an exception to its no-beard policy 
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for PFB sufferers.209  Although the court ultimately ruled that Domino’s was 
required to recognize such an exception to its no beard policy, 210  the court 
denied Bradley protection under the exception.211  The court found that Bradley 
suffered from only a mild case of PFB and hence was able to shave.212  In other 
words, although the no beard requirement did constitute impermissible race 
discrimination as applied to those PFB sufferers for whom shaving was really 
painful, as to Bradley, the no beard requirement was a legitimate workplace 
conformity demand.213
                                                 
209  Id. 
210  The court “remand[ed] to the District Court for entry of an injunction granting the EEOC the 
narrow prospective relief it seeks.  The injunction shall be carefully tailored to place Domino’s 
under the minimal burden of recognizing a limited exception to its no-beard policy for African 
American males who suffer from PFB and as a result of this medical condition are unable to 
shave.” Id. at 799. 
211  Id. at  796.  The court “affirmed the District Court’s finding that Bradley suffers only a mild 
case of PFB and can appear clean-shaven as not clearly erroneous.  Bradley thus was not entitled 
to relief and is no longer a party to the litigation.”  Id. at 796. 
212  Not surprisingly, courts also view compliance costs as low when noncompliance is due to a 
sense of racial or personal identity rather than physical pain.  Employees do not have success 
challenging employers’ no beard policies when the challenge is grounded in a personal 
preference rather than a physical need.  See, e.g., Wofford v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 460 
(N.D. Ca. 1978) (holding no beard policy was not racially discriminatory when applied to 
employee whose beard was an important part of his racial identity); Keys v. Continental Illinois 
National Bank, 357 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Il. 1973) (same); In Re Pacific Southwest Airlines, 77 LA 
(BNA) 320 (1981) (holding that employer could enforce its no beard policy against a pilot who 
“had become rather attached to [his] beard” and did not want to shave it”). 
    
213  As a doctrinal matter, courts ground their protection for PFB plaintiffs in a disparate impact 
framework rather than in the disparate treatment framework used to protect effeminate men and 
transsexuals in the sex context.  It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that this different 
doctrinal framework, rather than the same substantive concern with status discrimination, is 
driving the results.  In fact, courts stretch disparate impact doctrine considerably in order to find 
for plaintiffs in these cases.  First, courts allow plaintiffs to establish their prima facie case by 
pointing to general population data rather than to qualified labor pool data.  In other words, 
instead of showing the proportion of blacks and whites in the relevant qualified labor pool who 
are harmed by the hiring requirement, plaintiffs present only the more general evidence of the 
proportion of blacks and whites in the population at large who would be harmed by the hiring 
requirement. See EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54, 56-59 (D.C. Colo. 1981) (finding prima 
facie case of disparate impact by looking at general population data and noting that “it is 
scientifically proven that PFB is a disease unique or at least almost unique to blacks”); Johnson v. 
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The broad status-based antidiscrimination principle also helps explain 
why such protection is so rare in race cases.  Unlike the PFB cases, the vast 
majority of racial conformity cases involve demands whose satisfaction is, at 
least perceived by courts to be, well within minority workers’ control.  Indeed, it 
is employees’ ready control over the traits at issue that courts emphasize in 
denying antidiscrimination protection.  In Rogers, for example, the court 
emphasized that Rogers could easily comply physically with the no cornrows 
rule by covering her hair or wearing it in a bun.  Similarly, in Spun Steak, the 
court emphasized that the bilingual plaintiffs could simply choose to speak 
English in compliance with the English-only rule.  Because the prohibited traits 
have not been medicalized, as they have in GID cases, courts discount and ignore 
both the physical and psychic harm that would result from their abandonment.  
Because the demanded traits are discrete and clearly defined, as they are not in 
the effeminate men cases, courts view compliance as easily attainable.   Minority 
                                                                                                                                                 
Memphis Police Dept., 713 F. Supp. 244, 247-48 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) (finding disparate impact 
based on general population data of race-based impact of PFB and noting that “there is no way of 
determining how many, if any, black officers failed to apply or left the Department because they 
had folliculitis”); Boyd, 619 A.2d at 315 (finding disparate impact from no beard policy by looking 
at general population data regarding PFB).  Second, and more importantly, courts allow plaintiffs 
to establish a disparate impact without any evidence, and indeed despite contrary evidence, that 
the hiring requirement is leading to a lower proportion of blacks in the relevant position than 
would be expected absent the challenged criteria.  See Trailways, 530 F. Supp. at 56 (rejecting 
defendant’s argument that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case of disparate impact because 
the defendant’s “employment of black drivers and other public contact employees exceeds 
percentagewise the overall Denver or Colorado percentage of blacks”); Boyd, 619 A.2d at 315 
(finding disparate impact despite defendant’s argument that “the evidence did not prove that the 
University’s policy has affected any African American male other than Mr. Boyd” and 
defendant’s argument that “the University employment statistics show that the University 
employs a higher percentage of African Americans than is found in the labor pool or in other 
similar agency positions”). 
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workers’ nonconformity with racially dominant workplace norms is seen as a 
form of conduct rather than as a reflection of status. 
It is likely, though perhaps counterintuitive, that courts’ refusal to 
treat virtually any expressions of racial identity as status-like is, at least in 
part, a legacy of the civil rights movement.  As civil rights activists 
struggled to define and promote a conception of racial justice and 
equality, two competing positions fought for prominence—integrationism 
and nationalism.214  Integrationists responded to the country’s racist 
legacy of essentializing blacks as different and inferior to whites by 
denying the significance of race altogether.  Integrationists equated racial 
justice with racial transcendence whereby individuals interacted and 
competed with each other in a color-blind world.215  Black nationalists, in 
contrast, argued that race did matter.  They argued that blacks and whites 
had distinct communities, histories and traditions.216  They argued not for 
racial transcendence but for the distribution and equalization of power 
across races.217
                                                 
214  See Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 823 (explaining that “[t]he clash 
between  nationalism and integrationism extended from the period starting in 1966—when the 
‘Black Power’ slogan first gained national prominence—and lasted until the marginalization of 
black nationalists was complete in the mid-1970s”). 
215  Id. at 771. 
216  Id. at 792 (explaining that “the idea of race as an organizing basis for group consciousness 
asserts that blacks and whites are different, in the sense of coming from different communities, 
neighborhoods, churches, families, and histories, and of being in various ways foreigners to each 
other”). 
217  Id. at 789. 
  Integrationism, they contended, did not involve a move to 
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some new neutrally color-blind society but assimilation to white norms 
and the abandonment of black culture.218
To integrationists, black nationalism smacked of the same kind of 
essentialism as white supremacy.
  
219
Along with the suppression of white racism that was the widely 
celebrated aim of civil rights reform, the dominant conception of 
racial justice was framed to require that black nationalists be 
equated with white supremacists, and that race consciousness on 
the part of either whites or blacks be marginalized as beyond the 
good sense of enlightened American culture.
  They believed that both ideologies needed 
to be suppressed and surpassed in the interests of racial justice.  Indeed, Gary 
Peller has argued that this equation of black nationalism with white supremacy, 
and the subsequent marginalization of both, was the compromise required to 
incorporate civil rights into the mainstream.  He explains:  
220
Integrationism did become mainstream, and a commitment to color blindness 
became the dominant social and legal conception of racial equality.
   
 
221
                                                 
218  Id. at 791, 797.  
  It is this 
219  See FORD, RACIAL CULTURE, supra note 7, at 33  (“Opposition to integration in the name of 
tradition and racial difference, while a competing position of the ‘nationalist’ left, was also and 
most notably the position of the racist right’); Peller, supra note 214, at 761 (explaining that “most 
white liberals and progressives, protecting themselves as the enlightened avante garde of the 
white community, automatically associated race nationalism with the repressive history of white 
supremacy”). 
220  Peller, supra note 214, at 760. 
221   See FORD, RACIAL CULTURE, supra note 7, at 33 (“Integration (especially colorblindness and 
assimilation) became the ideals of the mainstream in the 1960s and 1970s”); Peller, supra note 214, 
at 790 (describing the “centering of integrationism as the mainstream ideology of American good 
sense” and the marginalization of nationalism).  Certainly the split between integrationist and 
nationalist ideology was not as simple or stark as my description suggests, nor was the victory of 
integration over nationalism as complete.  A number of policies begun in the civil rights era 
refute any rigid commitment to colorblindness and reflect the country’s continued race 
consciousness.  See ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 190 (1992) (describing race 
balancing of public schools, affirmative action policies in business and race-based voting rights 
legislation).  
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commitment to racial transcendence and aversion to racial essentialism that 
helps ensure that courts virtually never view expressions of racial identity by 
minority workers as a function of their racial status as such.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 I have sought in this paper to both explain a body of case law and in the 
process to make sense of a paradox: why does Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination look so much more expansive than its prohibition on race 
discrimination?  Why, in particular, do workers appear to be receiving greater 
protection for expressions of gender identity than for expressions of racial 
identity? 
 I have argued that, in one sense, the paradox is illusory.  Courts are not 
interpreting Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination in a different and more 
expansive way than its prohibition on race discrimination.   I have argued, in 
particular, that there is no special antiassimilation-oriented antidiscrimination 
principle taking root in the sex context.  Instead courts are interpreting Title VII’s 
prohibitions on race and sex discrimination according to the same set of rather 
traditional antidiscrimination principles.  Courts check only those conformity 
demands that penalize status or reinforce protected group subordination.   
In another sense, however, the paradox is real.  Employees are more likely 
to find their workplace expressions of gender identity protected than their 
expressions of racial identity.  The difference, however, has more to do with 
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culture, and, perhaps, biology than with law.  Sex is treated as rich and complex 
in ways that race is not.  Indeed, individuals are viewed as having not only a sex 
but also a gender. While the two are no longer seen as invariably aligned, both 
are viewed as meaningful.  Both are treated as biologically or physiologically 
based and as having some recognizable external manifestations.  Race, in 
contrast, is viewed as a mere technical difference of skin tone unassociated with 
meaningful differences in behavior or self-presentation.  In short, race is empty 
while sex is loaded.   
These differences explain why similar legal principles lead to such very 
different results.  Because some gendered behaviors seem “natural” and 
immutable, they receive protection from workplace discipline.  Because no racial 
expressions are viewed the same way, they do not. 
Moreover, because gender is dichotomous—people are either gender 
female or gender male--gendered conformity demands impact the workplace 
success of women and men differently.   Again, the same is not true for race.  
Racially loaded conformity demands are unitary and do not impose different 
obligations or impediments on different racial groups.  As a result, only the 
former trigger Title VII’s antisubordination-oriented protection.   
 As I said at the outset, my goal in this project has been to explain a body 
of case law, not to join the current normative debate over it.  Nonetheless, what 
the present analysis reveals is that arguments to expand (or shrink) Title VII’s 
protection of nonconformists must operate not only at the level of legal doctrine 
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but also at the level of culture.  Antidiscrimination scholars must recognize how 
fundamentally different social conceptions of race and sex are affecting the 
impact of law in unexpected, and seemingly ahistorical, ways. 
  
 
